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UPON FURTHER REVIEW: RUSH PRUDENTIAL HMO, INC. v. 
MORAN AND A NEW ERA OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION 
LIABILITY 
ALLEN D. ALLRED* AND DON L. DANIEL** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As managed care organizations (“MCOs”) assume an increasingly 
important role in the delivery of healthcare services to patients,1 they find 
themselves prime targets of, among others, federal and state policymakers, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and consumer/patient rights activists.  Many health care 
industry insiders believe the increased attention has had negative consequences 
for consumers of health care services.  The president of the American 
Association of Health Plans (“AAHP”), for example, has stated that “reckless 
 
* Mr. Allred is a partner in the firm of Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, and is co-
chairman of the firm’s health care practice group.  Mr. Allred concentrates his practice in 
healthcare and civil litigation representing managed care organizations, hospitals, integrated 
healthcare delivery systems and other healthcare providers.  He has extensive experience in 
representing healthcare clients both at the trial and appellate levels, and is a frequent writer and 
lecturer on healthcare and civil litigation topics.  Mr. Allred was chairman for three years of the 
Healthcare Liability and Litigation Committee of the American Health Lawyers Association.  
Additionally, he is a member of the American Bar Association (Health Law and Litigation 
Sections) and the Missouri and Illinois Bar Associations (Health and Civil Trial Practice 
Sections).  Mr. Allred received his bachelor’s degree from the University of Wisconsin and his 
Juris Doctor from St. Louis University School of Law where he was a member of the Law 
Journal. 
** Mr. Daniel is an associate in the firm of Thompson Coburn LLP, St. Louis, Missouri, and is a 
member of the firm’s health care practice group.  Mr. Daniel received his bachelor’s degree from 
St. Louis University and his Juris Doctor from St. Louis University School of Law where he was 
editor-in-chief of the St. Louis University Public Law Review. 
  Special thanks to Milada Goturi, Brad Crandall and Rita Kazembe, associates, 
Thompson Coburn LLP, for their assistance in researching and drafting this article. 
 1. Studies indicate that as many as 170-180 million Americans are enrolled in MCOs.  See 
National Conference of State Legislatures, Managed Care Insurer Liability, at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/liable.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).  See also Clive Riddle, 
The Future of Managed Care: An Outline, Managed Care On-Line, at www.mcareol.com/ 
mcolfre1/cresem.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).  Other surveys indicate that up to 88% of all 
Americans with private health insurance are enrolled in a managed care plan (up from just 27% in 
1988).  Alliance For Retired Americans, Patients’ Bill of Rights, available at 
http://www.retiredamericans.org (last visited Dec. 26, 2002). 
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litigation” is among the chief challenges facing the United States health care 
system,2 and cites a recent AAHP-commissioned Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
analysis (“PWC Report”) which concluded that 27 cents of every new dollar 
spent on health care in 2001 was “driven by litigation, government mandates 
and regulation and waste, fraud and abuse.”3  The net result, according to the 
survey, was an added cost to the health care system of approximately $18 
billion in 2001.4 
While it is clear that there are many factors which have led to increases in 
consumer health care costs, the extent to which any one factor is more 
responsible than others is certainly debatable.  Nevertheless, a quick glance at 
the recent legal “headlines” leaves little doubt that MCOs are being forced to 
expend increasingly significant amounts of time and money in the defense of, 
among other things, complex medical malpractice and class action lawsuits.5  
In the span of just one month in early 2002, for example, “The medical 
societies of New Jersey, South Carolina and Tennessee filed separate lawsuits 
accusing some of the nation’s largest health plans of engaging in illegal 
business practices.”6 
The dramatic increase in health care system regulation/litigation has had 
some incredible effects: 
 During 2001-2002, employers’ health care costs increased an average 
of 13.7%; 
 Annual health care insurance premiums for employees and retirees 
increased an estimated 13% in 2001; 
 The median malpractice award increased 43% in 2000 to $1 million; 
and 
 
 2. HMO Trade Group Cites Challenges in Health Care System,” Reckless Litigation” 
Among Them, MEALEY’S MANAGED CARE LIABILITY REP., June 14, 2002, at 1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  According to Karen Ignagni, President of AAHP, ‘“[These] resources alone could 
have provided coverage to 6.8 million Americans.’”  Id. 
 5. See Acad. of Med. of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. A0204947 (Ohio Cir. Ct., 
July 27, 2002); Acad. of Med. of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. 02-C1-903 (Ky. Cir. Ct., 
July 27, 2002).  The two previously cited cases are proposed class actions filed on June 27, 2002 
alleging that four health plans participated in an “anti-competitive and illegal combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade” to fix physician reimbursement rates.  See also Chester County 
Hosp. v. Independence Blue Cross, No. 02-CV-2746 (E.D. Pa., May 8, 2002) (a class action suit 
filed wherein a hospital alleges the region’s largest insurer has violated antitrust and other laws by 
“abusing its dominant market power,” and seeks more than $20 million in damages and other 
injunctive relief.) 
 6. Laura B. Benko, States of Frustration; More Medical Groups Step Up Battle Against 
Insurers, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 20, 2002, at 16, 16 (2002). 
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 Malpractice insurance premiums increased from 20% to 100% for some 
providers.7 
Indeed, large verdicts awarded under emerging theories of managed care 
liability have caused some to forecast managed care litigation as “the tobacco 
litigation of the turn of the century.”8 
The statistics set forth above tell only part of the story.  Increased costs 
lead to fewer employers offering health benefits for employees, and many of 
those employers who continue to offer such benefits must demand additional 
contributions from employees to cover rising expenses.  Ultimately all of this 
results in (a) fewer Americans having health insurance coverage (some 
estimate that 300,000 people lose coverage for every one-percent increase in 
premiums), and (b) shortages in quality medical care as physicians and other 
health care providers deal with skyrocketing malpractice premiums.9 
Unfortunately for MCOs and benefit plan administrators, the surge in 
litigation (as well as the inevitable increase in litigation costs) coincides with 
an erosion of traditional protections from liability once afforded to such 
entities.  Thus while MCOs struggle to find ways to control the costs of 
providing high quality medical care, the very mechanisms used to control such 
costs are increasingly being opened to scrutiny and attack in the courts and 
legislatures. 
A recent and important example of the judiciary’s newfound willingness to 
disregard liability protections once relied upon by MCOs can be seen in the 
Supreme Court’s controversial 5-4 decision in Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. 
Moran.10  While this case will be discussed in greater detail in this Article’s 
section on ERISA, it is sufficient to note for purposes of this Introduction, that 
whereas health plans and their medical directors were once granted a great 
amount of deference for discretionary medical coverage decisions, Rush 
appears to stand for the proposition that, under state law, independent 
physician reviewers can make medical necessity decisions that will be binding 
 
 7. Louise Kertesz, What is Fueling the Increase in Health Care Costs?, HEALTHPLAN 
MAG., Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.aahp.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Inside_AAHP/ 
Healthplan_Magazine/What. . .S. 
 8. Michael Higgins, Second Opinions on HMOs, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 60, 62.  
Interestingly enough, Richard Scruggs (the Pascagoula, Mississippi, lawyer who pioneered the 
“big tobacco” litigation), together with David Boies (who handled the federal government’s case 
against Microsoft), are leading an assault on the HMO industry, charging several top managed 
care companies with racketeering. 
 9. See American Association of Health Plans, Class Action Litigation Against the Managed 
Care Industry, at http://www.classactioncenter.org/legal/litigation.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).  
Medical care shortages are especially acute in areas where such care is needed most (for example, 
rural and economically depressed areas).  Id. 
 10. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151 (2002). 
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on MCOs and licensed health insurers.11  MCOs are now facing the prospect of 
having to adapt their medical management decision-making processes to 
account for physician review standards that may vary greatly among the 
states.12 
Perhaps more disturbing for MCOs and benefit plan administrators than 
the actual decision in Rush is the fact that the decision appears to be just 
another step in a judicial trend of upholding state laws that negatively impact 
the ability of MCOs to administer health plans in a uniform manner across the 
states.  The bottom line appears to be, of course, that MCOs, employers and, 
ultimately, consumers of health care services, can expect to see continuing 
increases in costs. 
In this Article, we provide an analysis of significant ongoing liability 
issues for MCOs (especially in light of recent developments such as the Rush 
decision), as well as an outline of “emerging” areas of MCO liability.  In Part 
II, we provide a brief summary of ERISA and an analysis of the courts’ trend 
towards upholding state laws that once would have been preempted.  Part III is 
an outline of “traditional” areas of MCO liability, including direct liability (for 
example, negligent supervision/retention of physicians), vicarious liability (for 
example, medical malpractice), tortious interference with contract and breach 
of warranty.  Part IV focuses on RICO and the slew of class action claims filed 
against MCOs several years ago, as well as the status of certification of new 
classes.  Finally, Part V examines the theories behind developing areas of 
MCO liability including antitrust, utilization review and provider de-selection. 
II.  IMPACT OF ERISA ON MCO LIABILITY 
A. Overview of ERISA and the ERISA “Preemption” Clause 
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) was enacted in 
1974 to protect the pension plan assets of American workers from 
misappropriation by corporate and union pension plan managers.13  “ERISA 
applies to all employee pension, health, and other benefit plans established by 
private sector employers (other than churches) or by employee organizations 
such as unions.”14  As a result, virtually all privately-employed Americans who 
 
 11. Joel L. Michaels & Robin J. Bowen, Rush to Judgment?  An Analysis of Rush Prudential 
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, HEALTH L. DIG., Aug. 2002, at 24, 28. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See SARA ROSENBAUM, AN OVERVIEW OF MANAGED CARE LIABILITY: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR PATIENT RIGHTS AND FEDERAL AND STATE REFORM, at ii (2001).  See also Patricia Mullen 
Ochmann, Managed Care Organizations Manage to Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity vs. 
Quality Lead to ERISA’s Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 580-81 
(2001). 
 14. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, ERISA PREEMPTION MANUAL FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY 
MAKERS 5 (2000). 
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receive health benefits as part of their employment are covered by an ERISA 
plan. 
ERISA does not require “employers to establish employee benefit plans,” 
nor does it mandate the “benefits employers must provide if they to choose to 
offer such a plan.”15  While ERISA generally regulates the structure and 
operation of pension plans, employers are granted “broad discretion over the 
design of their health plans,” including discretion over whether health care 
coverage for employees will be obtained through managed care companies.16 
“[D]rafted . . . in reaction to an environment of failed [multi-state] pension 
plans and the economic dangers associated with mass forfeiture,”17 ERISA was 
enacted in an effort to establish uniformity in the regulation of benefit plan 
administration.  To accomplish this objective, Congress included in ERISA a 
“preemption” clause which provides that ERISA shall supersede “conflicting 
or inconsistent state and local regulations.”18  Peculiar in its strength, the 
ERISA preemption clause has been interpreted to preempt not only conflicting 
state laws that regulate ERISA health plans, but also state laws that merely 
“relate” to such plans.19  As a result, ERISA historically has been held to 
displace even state regulation that is compatible with federal regulation of 
health care benefit plans.20 
Obtaining ERISA preemption is important for MCOs (particularly in areas 
such as medical malpractice) because ERISA remedies are generally limited to 
either the cost of the denied benefit or injunctive relief.21  ERISA precludes 
punitive damages and damages to make the beneficiary ‘whole’ from denial of 
medical treatment.22  Further, if a plan participant dies as a result of an MCO’s 
decision to deny benefits, there generally is no remedy available under 
ERISA.23 
 
 15. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 266-27 (2000). 
 16. ROSENBAUM, supra note 13, at 8 (citing Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225-26). 
 17. Sharon Reece, The Circuitous Journey to the Patients’ Bill of Rights: Winners and 
Losers, 65 ALB. L. REV. 17, 20 (2001). 
 18. Ochmann, supra note 13, at 581 (citing 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 197 and 29, 933 (1974) 
(quoting Sen. Williams)). 
 19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000). 
 20. Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The 
Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 261 (1997) (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-100 
nn. 18-20 (1983)). 
 21. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000). 
 22. June M. Sullivan, Overcoming the ERISA Barrier to Recovery Against HMOs: Current 
Trends and Legislation, 4 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 245, 254 (2001) (citing Jane M. Mulcahy, 
The ERISA Preemption Question: Why Some HMO Members are Dying for Congress to Amend 
ERISA, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 877, 881 (1999)). 
 23. Mulcahy, supra note 22, at 883. 
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It is important to clarify that ERISA specifically “saves” state insurance 
regulation but exempts employee benefit plans from regulation as insurance.24  
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., held that 
New York’s Human Rights Law forbidding discrimination in employee benefit 
plans on the basis of pregnancy, and its Disability Benefits Law requiring 
employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work because of 
pregnancy, were preempted by ERISA because they “relate to” employee 
benefit plans.25  In contrast, the Supreme Court, in Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. Massachusetts, held that a Massachusetts statute requiring certain 
minimum mental-health-care benefits to be provided to Massachusetts 
residents insured under a general health insurance policy or employee benefit 
plan was not preempted by ERISA so far as it applied to the insurance policy 
and not the employee benefit plan itself.26 
By the late 1980s, courts were broadly interpreting ERISA’s “relate to” 
language to preempt state-based tort liability for tortious administration of 
employee benefits.27  Examples include Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux 
(Supreme Court held that a Mississippi common-law cause of action arising 
from “improper processing of a claim for benefits” was preempted by 
ERISA),28 and Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc. (U.S. District Court for 
Eastern District of Louisiana held that ERISA preempts a state-based tort claim 
against an MCO and limits recovery for the death of a newborn to the costs of 
the care recommended by the plaintiff’s physician and denied by the utilization 
reviewer)..29 
With respect to the preemption of state-based tort claims against benefit 
plan administrators and MCOs, the Corcoran case established a standard that 
would hold for several years.30  An example of the reach of the Corcoran 
rationale can be seen in the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Kuhl v. Lincoln 
National Health Plan.31  In Kuhl, the plaintiff was denied bypass surgery on 
the grounds that it was determined medically unnecessary.32  The plaintiff was 
awarded benefits upon adjudication, but had progressed to the point of needing 
a transplant.33  The plaintiff died while adjudicating the transplant issue, and 
 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000). 
 25. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-98 (1983). 
 26. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-746 (1985). 
 27. Wayne Blackmon, The Emerging Convergence of the Doctrine of Informed Consent and 
the Judicial Reinterpretation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 
377, 380 (1998). 
 28. 481 U.S. 41 (1985). 
 29. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 30. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381. 
 31. 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 32. Id. at 300. 
 33. Id. 
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the benefit plan was found liable only for costs of care denied.34  By the time 
of the Kuhl case, ERISA had come to be recognized as a basis for dismissing 
state-based tort claims against plan administrators and MCOs that were based 
on wrongful denial of benefits or wrongful interference with benefits.35 
B. Erosion of the ERISA Preemption 
For over two decades, MCOs and plan administrators have relied on 
ERISA preemption and an almost literal interpretation of its “relate to” 
language to “insulate themselves from inflamed state court juries relying upon 
state statutory or common law bad faith doctrines and special interest groups or 
active insurance commissioners who sought to undermine the uniformity of the 
benefit programs of multistate employers.”36  While the ERISA preemption 
clause has received intense judicial scrutiny almost since its inception,37 
several Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1980s justified such reliance by 
virtue of their broad interpretation and application of the preemption.38 
By the mid 1990s, however, the Court began indicating dissatisfaction with 
its previously liberal interpretation of ERISA’s “relate to” language (as 
established in the Shaw line of cases), thus signaling the beginning of a gradual 
erosion of the ERISA preemption.39  In three cases commonly referred to as 
the “Travelers Trilogy”40—New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,41 California Division of Labor 
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction, N.A., Inc.,42 and DeBuono 
v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund 43—the Court seized upon 
language in Shaw indicating that “some state actions may affect employee 
benefit plans in too tenuous, remote or peripheral a manner to warrant a 
finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”44 
 
 34. Id. at 300-01. 
 35. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381. 
 36. Edward A. Scallet, ERISA Preemption—Is it Still a Viable Doctrine? (Jan. 6, 1999), at 
http://www.insurancelegal.com/erisa199.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2002). 
 37. Ochmann, supra note 13, at 582-83.  See also Torrin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, 
Implications of Negligent Selection and Retention of Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 383, 401 (1995).  In 1992, Justice Stevens reported that “[a] recent LEXIS search 
indicated that there [were] . . . over 2,800 judicial opinions addressing ERISA pre-emption,” 
District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 135 n.3 (1995). 
 38. Scallet, supra note 36 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) and Pilot 
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1985)). 
 39. Blaire S. Osgood, Note, The Treachery of the ERISA Preemption: Ceci N’est Pas Une 
Benefits Determination, 81 B.U. L. REV. 867, 871 ( 2001). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
 42. 519 U.S. 316 (1997). 
 43. 520 U.S. 806 (1997). 
 44. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983). 
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First, in Travelers, commercial insurers of ERISA plans challenged a New 
York State rate scheme that imposed surcharges on hospital and HMO rates for 
ERISA plan participants for purposes of funding a Blue Cross rate program.45  
The Court rejected the Second Circuit’s holding that the surcharges “related 
to” ERISA plans because they imposed an economic burden on plan 
administration,46 and instead adopted the position that Congress did not intend 
to preempt state law and, therefore, “clear and manifest” congressional intent 
would be required before federal preemption of state action in areas of 
“traditional state regulation” would be allowed.47 
Examining ERISA’s “relate to” language, the Court in Travelers 
hypothesized that “really, universally, relations stop nowhere,”48 and, as such, 
almost any state law could be deemed to relate to ERISA.  That being the case, 
the Court determined that ERISA preemption should be determined in light of 
the “objectives” of the ERISA statute, rather than its “unhelpful” text.49  Upon 
examination of the Congressional Record, the Court concluded that “the basic 
thrust of the pre-emption clause . . . was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in 
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit 
plans.”50  Applying such rationale to the facts at hand, the Court concluded that 
the New York State surcharge on ERISA plan hospital and HMO rates was an 
indirect influence that could affect a benefit plan’s shopping decisions, but the 
surcharge would not bind plan administrators to any particular choice.  As 
such, the Court held that the New York State law did not “relate to” ERISA 
because the surcharge did not preclude uniform benefit plan administration or 
the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package if a plan wished to 
provide one.51 
Two years later, the Court handed another victory to the states in 
California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Construction, N.A., Inc.52  Continuing its dramatic shift from a broad, literal 
interpretation of the term “relates” as used in Section 514 of ERISA, to a more 
narrow interpretation focused on the impact of state law on the structure and 
choices of an ERISA benefit plan,53 the Court considered a California statute 
that permits contractors to pay less than the prevailing wage to apprentices 
 
 45. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. at 649. 
 46. Id. at 654. 
 47. Id. at 654-55. 
 48. Id. at 655 (quoting HENRY JAMES, RODERICK HUDSON, at xli (1980)). 
 49. Id. at 656. 
 50. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 657 (1995). 
 51. Id. at 659. 
 52. 519 U.S. 316 (1996). 
 53. Blackmon, supra note 27, at 381. 
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who are enrolled in state-approved apprenticeship programs.54  The Court said 
that while the California law has an economic impact on ERISA plans, such 
economic impact is too tenuous a relationship to justify preemption of a state 
law.55  Significantly, the Court’s opinion in Dillingham advances the 
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state law in areas of 
traditional state regulation.56 
Finally, in DeBuono, the Supreme Court went a step further and held that 
even a direct tax on an ERISA plan does not require a finding of preemption of 
state law.57  According to the Court, the party advancing a theory of ERISA 
preemption “bear[s] the considerable burden of overcoming the starting 
presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state law.”58  In stark 
contrast to pre-Travelers cases (where MCOs typically could rely on the courts 
to preempt claims of medical malpractice and negligence against MCOs based 
on the theory that such claims “related to” ERISA benefit plans), DeBuono 
reinforces the emerging commitment of the Court to preserve state law in areas 
of traditional state regulation, including the practice of medicine.59 
The Travelers line of cases clearly represents a dramatic shift in the 
Court’s application of ERISA preemption to state law.  While one can 
justifiably conclude that, prior to the Travelers cases, courts began with a 
presumption that ERISA preempts state law, it seems clear that defendants in 
post-Travelers actions must present clear evidence that the state law at issue 
conflicts with ERISA in order to obtain preemption. 
C. The Quality vs. Quantity Distinction 
Injured patients seeking tort recovery from MCOs for the alleged actions 
or omissions of affiliated hospitals and/or physicians (that is, vicarious 
liability) have benefited from the continued weakening of the ERISA 
preemption clause.60  In Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.,61 the Third Circuit 
consolidated two federal district court cases alleging medical malpractice.62  
One of the lower court cases involved a widowed spouse’s claim that her 
 
 54. Dillingham Construction, 519 U.S. at 319.  While apprenticeship programs are not 
traditionally thought of as a “benefit,” ERISA specifically states that they are covered by the act, 
and subject to all its requirements. 
 55. Id. at 334. 
 56. Id. 
 57. DeBuono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund.  520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997). 
 58. Id. at 814. 
 59. Osgood, supra note 39, at 874. 
 60. Please note that vicarious liability, as a cause of action against MCOs, is discussed in 
greater detail in Part III of this Article. 
 61. 57 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 62. Id. at 351. 
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husband’s death was due to the refusal of a hospital to perform a blood test,63 
and the other alleged that an MCO was vicariously liable for the failure of its 
network physicians to diagnose and treat a condition which caused an infant to 
be delivered stillborn.64 
After U.S. Healthcare was sued under state law (in both lower court cases 
cited above), it removed the cases to federal court, arguing that each case was 
completely preempted by ERISA.65  U.S. Healthcare contended that removal 
was proper because treatment had been provided as a benefit under an ERISA 
plan, and resulting state law claims relating to such plans must be completely 
preempted.66  In each case, the district court agreed and dismissed the 
plaintiff’s state law claims.67 
Interestingly, the threshold issue considered in Dukes was procedural in 
nature.  In determining whether it was proper to remove the state cases to 
federal court, the Court first considered whether the cases “arise under” federal 
law.68  The Court noted that the question of whether a case arises under federal 
law is made by examining the plaintiff’s complaint (the so-called “well-
pleaded complaint rule”), and, therefore, removal based on a federal defense 
ordinarily would not be proper.69  However, the Court went on to recognize 
that in certain circumstances, “Congress may so completely preempt a 
particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is 
necessarily federal in character.”70  The Supreme Court has determined that the 
“complete preemption” doctrine applies to state law claims that “fit within the 
scope of ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.”71 
Next, continuing its trend of strong reliance on Congressional intent when 
examining ERISA preemption issues, the Dukes Court reasoned that Congress 
intended to preempt state law claims concerning denial of benefits under 
ERISA plans (“quantity of benefits”), but did not intend to regulate or control 
issues regarding the quality of benefits received.72  Examining the facts of the 
consolidated cases, the Court concluded that the state law claims involved 
quality of care received rather than recovery of benefits due under the plan.  As 
 
 63. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare Sys., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 39, 40 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 64. Visconti v. U.S. Healthcare, 857 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 
 65. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352-353. 
 66. Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1100-01. 
 67. Dukes, 848 F. Supp. at 42; Visconti, 857 F. Supp. at 1105. 
 68. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 353. 
 69. Id. at 353-54. 
 70. Id. at 353. 
 71. Phyllis C. Borzi, Distinguishing Between Coverage and Treatment Decisions Under 
ERISA Health Plans: What’s Left of ERISA Preemption?, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1219, 1249 (2001). 
 72. Karla S. Bartholomew, Note, ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims in 
Managed Care: Asserting a New Statutory Interpretation, 52 VANDERBILT L. REV. 1131, 1158 
(1999) (citing Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356). 
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such, the Court held that removal of the state law claims to federal court was 
improper because the cause of action was not completely preempted.73 
Unfortunately for MCOs, the Court in Dukes did not offer guidance to 
distinguish claims for denial of benefits from quality of care claims.74  Further, 
because the doctrine of “complete preemption” is inevitably raised each time 
an MCO seeks to remove a state law malpractice claim to federal court based 
on ERISA preemption, post-Dukes courts have increasingly relied on the 
ambiguous quality versus quantity distinction.75 
As noted above, the ability of plaintiffs to avoid preemption of state 
malpractice claims opens the door to punitive and compensatory damage 
awards otherwise unattainable under ERISA.  The “quality vs. quantity” 
distinction established in Dukes, as well as the failure of the Court to articulate 
a clear standard for making such a distinction, leaves MCOs exposed to 
malpractice liability in any number of circumstances, especially those where 
failure to provide a service can be characterized as either negligence (“quality 
of care”) or benefit denial (“quantity of care”). 
D. Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran and its Implications for ERISA 
Preemption 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. has 
been termed “perhaps the most important ERISA preemption case to ever 
come before the Supreme Court.”76  The Rush case “highlights the continuing 
struggle courts have in defining concise and predictable boundaries as to the 
scope of [ERISA] preemption of state laws,”77 and “will encourage more state 
regulation and . . . trigger lawsuits on how far states can go to protect patients 
from [adverse MCO benefit decisions].”78 
In a 5-4 ruling on June 20, 2002, the Court held that ERISA does not 
preempt an Illinois law requiring independent review when an HMO and a 
patient disagree over whether a course of treatment is medically necessary.79  
In a “major victory for HMO members and states’ rights,”80 the Court reasoned 
 
 73. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 356-57.  The Third Circuit remanded the case to district court with 
instructions to send the cases to state court for trial on the issue of vicarious liability of the MCO 
for the actions of its health care providers.  Id. at 361. 
 74. Bartholomew, supra note 72, at 1158. 
 75. Id. at 1158-59 (citing Schmid v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 963 F. Supp. 942, 944 (D. 
Or. 1997); Hoyt v. Edge, No. 97-3631, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846, at *4-7 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 
1997); Roessert v. Health Net, 929 F. Supp. 343, 349-50 (N.D. Cal. 1996)). 
 76. Mark D. DeBofsky, Moran v. Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc.—The New Paradigm of 
ERISA Preemption, at http://www.debofsky.com/moran-article.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2002). 
 77. Michaels and Bowen, supra note 11, at 24. 
 78. Marcia Coyle, HMO Outlook: More Court Action, NAT’L L.J., June 24, 2002, at A1. 
 79. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., v. Moran, 122 S. Ct. 2151, 2170-71 (2002). 
 80. ERISA Preemption: Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, HEALTH L. LITIG. REP., June 2002, 
at 3. 
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that independent state review panels are exempt from federal preemption 
because HMOs are insurance companies subject to state regulation.81 
1. Procedural Background.  In this case, Rush-Prudential HMO, Inc. 
denied coverage to Debra Moran, an Illinois resident, for a requested shoulder 
surgery procedure.  Ms. Moran opted to obtain surgery through an out-of-
network provider at her own expense, incurring medical expenses in excess of 
$94,000.82  Ms. Moran then sued Rush in state court under the Illinois Health 
Maintenance Organization Act (“Illinois HMO Act”) which requires HMOs to 
(a) submit to independent physician review where there is disagreement 
between plan and beneficiary over whether a course of treatment is medically 
necessary, and (b) to comply with the decision of the independent physician 
reviewer.83 
Rush removed the case to federal court on the grounds that Moran’s claim 
was preempted by ERISA and contended that the case should be decided in 
accordance with ERISA’s civil enforcement provision.  The district court 
remanded the case to state court, however, after ruling that Moran’s request for 
independent physician review under state law would not require interpretation 
of the terms of the benefit plan (that is, it was not a “quantity” or “coverage” 
determination) and thus her cause of action was not “completely preempted.”84  
On remand, the state court ordered Rush to submit to an independent physician 
reviewer in accordance with Illinois law, who in turn found that Ms. Moran’s 
surgery was, in fact, “medically necessary” (based on the language of Ms. 
Moran’s insurance certificate as well as the reviewer’s own medical 
judgment).85  Nevertheless, Rush’s medical director rejected the decision of the 
independent physician review and denied Moran’s claim.86 
Next, 
Moran amended her complaint in state court to seek reimbursement for [her] 
surgery as “medically necessary” under [the Illinois] HMO Act, [whereupon] 
Rush [once] again removed [the case] to federal court [on the grounds] that 
Moran’s amended complaint stated a claim for ERISA benefits (a “quantity” or 
“coverage” claim) and was thus completely preempted by ERISA’s civil 
enforcement provisions.87 
The federal district court granted Rush’s motion for summary judgment and 
Moran appealed to the Seventh Circuit.88 
 
 81. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2160-62. 
 82. Id. at 2156-57. 
 83. Id. at 2157. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2157. 
 87. Id. at 2157-58. 
 88. Id. at 2158. 
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that ERISA 
“broadly preempts” state law which “relates to” employee benefit plans, but 
noted that state laws which “regulate insurance” are “saved” from ERISA 
preemption.89  In reversing the lower court, however, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the state independent physician review provision was part of the 
insurance contract between Rush and Moran and did not constitute a forbidden 
“alternative remedy” to the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA.90  The 
Court of Appeals reasoned that the Illinois HMO Act did not “authorize any 
particular form of relief in state courts; rather, with respect to ERISA [] health 
plan[s], the judgment of the independent reviewer is only enforceable in an 
action brought under ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme.”91 
2. Supreme Court Decision.  In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Illinois HMO Act 
is not preempted by ERISA because: (a) the state law qualifies as a regulation 
of insurance and thus is specifically “saved” from preemption,92 and (b) the 
Illinois HMO Act’s independent physician review provision for coverage 
disputes regarding medical necessity does not provide a remedy that conflicts 
with those available under the civil enforcement provisions of ERISA.93 
In determining that the Illinois HMO Act qualified as an insurance 
regulation, the majority opinion (written by Justice David H. Souter) spent 
significant time explaining that, while many HMOs act as both providers and 
insurers, nothing in the ERISA “saving” clause94 requires an either/or choice 
between provider and insurer when considering questions of state law 
preemption.95  As a result, if “providing insurance fairly accounts for [] 
application of [the] state law, the [ERISA] saving clause may apply” and 
preemption will not stand.96  According to the majority, it is unrealistic to think 
of HMO-style organizations without their insurance element, and thus 
preemption of the Illinois law’s independent review provision would be 
contrary to ERISA’s “saving” clause.97 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2158. 
 92. Id. at 2160-63. 
 93. Id. at 2170.  We should note that, in the wake of Rush, the Supreme Court already 
ordered the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision regarding Texas’ external 
review law in Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 2617 (2002).  In June 
2002, the Supreme Court “directed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to reconsider its decision in 
[Montemayor].”  The U.S. Supreme Court Last Week Directed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
to Reconsider Its Decision in Montemayor v. Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., MANAGED CARE 
WK., July 1, 2002, at 8. 
 94. See supra notes 14-35 and accompanying text. 
 95. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2160. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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Rejecting Rush’s alternative argument that the Illinois law should be 
preempted on the grounds that it creates an impermissible alternative remedy 
that conflicts with ERISA’s exclusive remedies (Rush actually argued that the 
independent physician review provision amounted to a de facto binding 
arbitration provision), the Court held that because the independent review is 
limited to medical necessity decisions, it is more akin to a second opinion and 
far removed from any notion of an enforcement scheme.98  Further, the court 
argued that the state law does not create any form of ultimate relief that 
conflicts with the type of relief obtainable in an ERISA proceeding and, as 
such, the state law is not categorically preempted.99 
3. Analysis.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas warns 
that the ruling in Rush “eviscerates” the uniformity of ERISA remedies 
because some 40 other states have similar laws, though [such laws] vary as to 
applicability, procedures, standards, deadlines and consequences of 
independent review.”100  According to the dissent (joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy), “allowing disparate state laws 
that provide inconsistent external review requirements to govern” a plan 
participant’s claim to benefits “is wholly destructive of Congress’ expressly 
stated goal of uniformity in this area.”101 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that in Travelers, the case which can be 
viewed as the beginning of the erosion of ERISA preemption, the Court 
specifically noted that Congressional intent would be the key to ERISA 
preemption decisions and that “the basic thrust of the pre-emption clause . . . 
was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally 
uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”102  Just as Travelers 
represented a departure from the Shaw line of cases (a move from a literal 
interpretation of ERISA’s “relate to” language to a focus on Congressional 
intent), Rush appears to have established yet another framework for 
preemption decisions.  Instead of focusing on Congressional intent, the key to 
preemption decisions now appears to be whether the state law at issue 
establishes a new cause of action or provides for a form of relief inconsistent 
with ERISA’s civil enforcement provisions.103  The only theme that appears to 
 
 98. Id. at 2168-69. 
 99. Id. at 2167. 
 100. Rush, 122 S. Ct. at 2178. 
 101. Id. 
 102. N.Y. State Conference Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655-57 (1995).  For a full discussion of Travelers, see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying 
text. 
 103. To illustrate this point, though in a light considerably more favorable to MCOs, see 
Sprecher v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, Inc., No. 02-CV-00580, 2002 U.S. Dist. WL 1917711 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 19, 2002).  In Sprecher, which was decided two months after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Rush, U.S. District Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter refused to follow a colleague’s recent 
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be consistent is that the courts will consistently force MCOs to overcome a 
strong presumption against preemption of state law. 
While the long-term impact of Rush is still open for debate, many feel that 
the Supreme Court’s decision will have a strong negative impact on managed 
care.  Elliot B. Pollack, co-chairman of Pullman & Comley’s health care 
section (Hartford, CT) states that “[t]he language of the decision is an open 
invitation to other forms of state legislation which, five years ago, one would 
have said would be trampling on ERISA proscriptions.”104  According to 
Sharon J. Arkin, an attorney who filed an amicus brief supporting Moran on 
behalf of the California Consumer Health Care Council, the Rush decision will 
impact state law in that it will give individual states an idea as to how far they 
can go with external review statutes.  Ms. Arkin states that approximately 50% 
of independently reviewed HMO denials are reversed in California.105  The 
Washington, D.C.-based Health Benefits Coalition, which represents 
employers, announced its opinion that the Rush decision deals “a blow in the 
battle to control the already soaring costs of health care.”106  After Rush, it is 
clear that MCOs and their medical directors will have to consider their 
standards for discretionary coverage decisions.  Uniformity in plan 
administration, the stated goal of ERISA, appears to be unattainable in light of 
the courts’ inability to adequately define the scope and parameters of ERISA 
preemption. 
III.  GENERAL THEORIES OF LIABILITY 
Generally speaking, individuals or entities failing to exercise reasonable 
care in the medical treatment of patients can be held liable for injuries that 
result from such negligence.107  Applying this principle in the managed care 
context, MCOs often can be held liable under state common law (qualified, of 
course, by ERISA’s preemption clause) not only for their own negligence, but 
 
decision allowing ERISA plaintiffs to pursue claims under Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute. Id. at 
*3.  Judge Buckwalter reasoned that the Pennsylvania bad faith law (which authorized punitive 
damages and interest penalties) “would significantly expand the potential scope of ultimate 
liability imposed upon employers by the ERISA scheme.” Id. at *7.  Buckwalter went on to hold 
that “because Pennsylvania’s bad faith statute provides a form of ultimate relief in a judicial 
forum that adds to the judicial remedies provided by ERISA, it is incompatible with ERISA’s 
exclusive enforcement scheme.”  Id. 
 104. Coyle, supra note 78, at A9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. David G. Savage, A Second Opinion, A.B.A.  J., Aug. 2002, at 36. 
 107. Angela M. Easley, Comment, A Call to Congress to Amend ERISA Preemption of HMO 
Medical Malpractice Claims: The Dissatisfactory Distinction Between Quality and Quantity of 
Care, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 293, 303-04 (1998) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
283  (1965)). 
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also for the negligence of their health care providers.108  The two main theories 
of MCO malpractice liability are direct liability and vicarious liability.109 
A. Direct Liability 
In direct liability causes of action, plaintiffs attempt to overcome ERISA 
preemption by seeking to hold MCOs liable for their own actions or omissions, 
as opposed to the actions or omissions of the MCO’s agents.110  Direct liability 
theories generally can be divided into two categories: (1) corporate negligence 
and (2) contract-based theories (including breach of contract, breach of 
warranty and fraud).111 
1. Corporate Negligence 
While common law principles of negligence have been applied to hospitals 
for quite some time,112 only recently have courts extended the doctrine of 
institutional or corporate negligence to MCOs.113  Underlying the tort of 
corporate negligence is a recognition of the comprehensive role of MCOs in 
the provision of health care services to their members, as well as a belief that 
MCOs should have “corresponding corporate responsibilities.”114 
In other words, corporate negligence is a theory that creates a non-
delegable duty owed directly to the patient.115  Under such theory, MCOs owe 
a duty of care to their patients “to maintain safe and adequate facilities and 
equipment; to select and retain competent[] [health care providers]; to oversee 
all persons who practice medicine; and to formulate, adopt and enforce 
adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for its patients.”116  A 
plaintiff seeking to recover damages under a theory of corporate negligence 
must show that MCOs are, in effect, practicing medicine in that they (a) are 
active managers of patient care, and (b) have influence over “physicians’ 
 
 108. Id. at 304. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Christine E. Brasel, Comment, Managed Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm 
Angry Members With Legal Ammo to Fire at Their MCOs For Cost Containment Tactics . . . But 
Could it Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 464 (1999). 
 111. James F. Henry, Comment, Liability of Managed Care Organizations After Dukes v. 
U.S. Healthcare: An Elemental Analysis, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 681, 702 (1996) 
 112. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E. 2d 253 (Ill. 1965). 
 113. See,e.g., Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill.,  730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000); Shannon 
v. McNulty,  718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998). 
 114. Jones, 730 N.E.2d at 1128. 
 115. Richard C. Miller, Breaking Down the Wall (ERISA): Theories of Recovery Against 
HMOs,  at http://www.mmmpalaw.com/CM/Articles/ articles27.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). 
 116. Anna M. Bamonte & Linda S. Hackett, HMO Liability Presents Risks to Physicians, 
PHYSICIAN’S NEWS DIGEST  (Jan. 1999), at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/898.html (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2002). 
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medical treatment decisions.”  Plaintiffs also must prove that their injuries 
were caused directly by the negligence of the MCO.117 
In the 1998 case Shannon v. McNulty, “Pennsylvania became the first 
jurisdiction to hold a managed care plan directly liable for its own . . . 
corporate negligence.”118  In Shannon, the plaintiff utilized an HMO-provided 
emergency care telephone service staffed by triage nurses to obtain advice 
regarding abdominal pains and other symptoms the plaintiff believed were 
associated with preterm labor.119  After first ordering the plaintiff to consult 
with her Ob-Gyn, the HMO’s telephone service staff responded to the 
plaintiff’s repeated requests for additional treatment by directing her to 
undergo a back examination.120  Ultimately, the plaintiff was admitted to a 
hospital for a back exam, but delivered a baby who died two days later due to 
severe prematurity.121 
The plaintiff in Shannon brought suit against the HMO, asserting claims of 
vicarious and direct liability under the corporate negligence doctrine.122  
Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the HMO breached its duty to oversee 
that the dispensing of advice by its telephone triage nurses would be performed 
in a medically reasonable manner.123  The court relied on Thompson v. Nason 
Hospital124 which, in the context of considering a hospital’s negligence, stated 
four general areas of corporate liability including “a duty to oversee all persons 
who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care.”125  In extending this 
duty to MCOs, the Shannon court compared “the corporate hospital’s role in 
the total health care of its patients” to the “central role played by HMOs in the 
total health care of its subscribers.”126 
Importantly, the court in Shannon held that when an HMO provides health 
care services, rather than just paying for those services, it has a non-delegable 
duty to render the medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care in a 
“medically reasonable” manner.127  Further, when an MCO makes a decision to 
limit a subscriber’s access to treatment, “that decision must pass the test of 
 
 117. Miller, supra note 115. 
 118. Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Application of the Corporate Negligence Doctrine to 
Managed Care Organizations: Sound Public Policy or Judicial Overkill?, 17 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 585, 609 (2001).  See Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super Ct. 
1998) 
 119. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 832. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 834. 
 123. Id. 
 124. 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991). 
 125. Id. at 707. 
 126. Shannon, 718 A.2d at 835. 
 127. Id. at 835-36. 
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medical reasonableness.”128  Perhaps most ominous for MCOs, however, the 
Shannon court stressed “HMOs may, under the right circumstances, be held 
corporately liable for any of the Thompson duties which causes harm to its 
subscribers.”129  The other Thompson duties are: (1) the duty to maintain “safe 
and adequate facilities and equipment” for patients; (2) the “duty to select and 
retain only competent physicians”; and (3) the “duty to formulate, adopt and 
enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for patients.”130 
In 2000, the Illinois Supreme Court followed Pennsylvania’s lead in Jones 
v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, where plaintiff was insured through defendant 
Chicago HMO.131  At the time of the incident at issue, plaintiff was assigned a 
particular primary care physician by her HMO, and such physician had 
undertaken treatment of plaintiff’s infant daughter (despite the fact that the 
physician was the primary care physician for at least 6000 patients).132  When 
plaintiff telephoned her physician (as instructed by her HMO) to describe 
symptoms her daughter had developed, the physician neglected to recommend 
hospitalization and instead advised giving castor oil to the child.133  The next 
day, plaintiff took her daughter to an emergency room because the infant’s 
symptoms had not improved.134  The baby was diagnosed with bacterial 
meningitis and was permanently disabled as a result of the illness.135 
The plaintiff in Jones filed complaints against both the primary care 
physician and the HMO, including a charge of corporate negligence against 
Chicago HMO for, inter alia, (1) negligently assigning an overloaded physician 
as the child’s primary care physician, and (2) negligently adopting procedures 
that required plaintiff to contact her primary care physician before visiting his 
office or seeking emergency care.136  Chicago HMO made no argument against 
the extension of corporate negligence to HMOs, and the court concluded that 
“the law imposes a duty upon HMOs to conform to the legal standard of 
reasonable conduct in light of the apparent risk.”137  To fulfill this duty, 
according to the Jones court, an HMO must act as would a “reasonably 
careful” HMO under the circumstances.138 
Managed care organizations also need to be cognizant of legislative 
initiatives to negate ERISA preemption by extending direct liability to MCOs.  
 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 836 (emphasis added). 
 130. Id. at 831. 
 131. Jones, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1123 (Ill. 2000). 
 132. Id. at 1125. 
 133. Id. at 1123. 
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 136. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d at 1122-24. 
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In California, for example, the Managed Health Care Insurance Accountability 
Act of 1999139 (which applies to services rendered or treatments denied after 
January 1, 2001) has as its stated purpose the protection of “persons covered 
by employer-sponsored health and disability plans by ensuring that health care 
providers rather than HMOs are in charge of patient care.”140 
The California statute makes HMOs liable for their own coverage 
decisions as well as coverage decisions made by any party they contract with, 
such as third party administrators or doctors.141  It imposes a duty of ordinary 
care upon the HMO to arrange for the provision of “medically necessary health 
services to its subscribers and enrollees, where the health care service is a 
benefit provided under the plan.”142  The plan also is 
liable for any and all harm legally caused by its failure to exercise ordinary 
care when both of the following apply: (1) the failure to exercise ordinary care 
resulting in the denial, delay, or modification of the health care service 
recommended for, or furnished to, a subscriber or enrollee; and (2) the 
subscriber or enrollee suffered substantial harm.143 
The California statute does provide one safe harbor for HMOs.  It requires 
the subscriber or enrollee to exhaust the HMO’s independent review procedure 
prior to bringing suit unless he or she can demonstrate that substantial harm 
has occurred or will imminently occur prior to the completion of the 
independent review.144  Alternatively, a participant may use California’s 
independent review process for treatment denials that are based on medical 
necessity where the health care service is otherwise eligible for coverage under 
the plan.145 
One area of direct liability which likely will see increased litigation is 
corporate negligence in provider selection or supervision (negligent 
credentialing and negligent retention of providers).146  Credentialing is the 
means by which an MCO verifies a provider’s qualifications and reputation 
prior to adding him or her to its provider panel and is one of many mechanisms 
utilized by MCOs to provide quality care while controlling costs.  By 
instituting a thorough and complete credentialing system, MCOs minimize the 
risk that subscribers will look to it to collect damages when the subscriber is 
 
 139. CAL. CIV. CODE  § 3428 (West Supp. 2002). 
 140. Beckman, Davis, Smith & Ruddy, L.L.P., New Legislation and Statutory Amendments, 
at http://www.beckmandavis.com/articles.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2002). 
 141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(b) (West Supp. 2002). 
 142. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3428(a) (West Supp. 2002). 
 143. Id. § 3428(a)(1)-(a)(2). 
 144. Id. § 3428(k)(1). 
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 146. Henry, supra note 111, at 701 (citing Joanne B. Stern, Malpractice in the Managed Care 
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injured due to the malpractice of a provider which the MCO held out to be 
qualified. 
Negligent credentialing and supervision claims typically are brought 
together with ostensible agency claims for medical malpractice, “because to 
prevail in a claim of negligent . . .  [credentialing] or [negligent] supervision, 
the plaintiff must first prove that the provider performed a negligent act.”147  
Thus while a plaintiff generally will face a “double hurdle” of proving 
negligence by both the provider and the MCO,148 courts have specifically held 
that MCOs have a duty to conduct “reasonable investigation[s]” of the 
physicians available to MCO enrollees to determine their competence and 
reputation in the medical community.149  Further, at least one court has rejected 
an HMO’s attempt to remove a negligent credentialing case to federal court via 
ERISA’s preemption clause, finding that the negligent credentialing complaint 
“attacked the quality of services rendered” by the HMO, and that state court 
was a proper forum because the plaintiff’s claim “fall[s] outside the scope of 
ERISA.”150 
MCOs also face potential liability from suits brought by providers 
claiming they were wronged in the credentialing process (wrongful termination 
of membership).  Unlike other areas of corporate negligence, however, MCOs 
can find certain protections from this type of liability in federal and state 
credentialing laws.  Such “peer review” immunity laws are a “powerful 
defense for credentialing entities and an almost insurmountable hurdle to 
individual health care providers.”151 
The primary source of peer review immunity is the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act of 1986 (“HCQIA”)152  Enacted to encourage health care 
entities to conduct meaningful review of their providers, HCQIA provides 
almost complete immunity to claims for monetary damages arising from 
credentialing/peer review actions.153  To qualify for immunity under HCQIA, 
not only must an MCO report certain adverse actions against providers to the 
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National Practitioner Data Bank,154 but it must provide a complete array of due 
process rights to providers whose membership is denied, modified, suspended 
or terminated.155 
An MCO’s decision to deny, modify, suspend or terminate a provider’s 
membership must be taken: (1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in 
furtherance of quality health care; (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the 
facts of the matter; (3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are 
afforded to the physician involved, and (4) in the reasonable belief that the 
action was warranted by the facts known after the investigation and hearing.156  
In addition, except for emergency situations, MCOs must provide certain 
notice and hearing procedures to physicians prior to making decisions which 
would adversely affect a provider’s membership.157 
The immunity provisions of HCQIA are extremely broad.  It protects the 
MCO’s credentialing committee members and any other MCO committee-
members engaged in credentialing-related activities.158  The immunity can 
“halt suits against an MCO by a physician adversely affected by a 
credentialing decision including suits for defamation, abuse of process, 
malicious prosecution, antitrust and tortious interference with contractual 
relations.”159  In fact, there is a statutory presumption of immunity which 
courts have indicated must be rebutted by the party opposing the motion 
raising the immunity defense.160 
In light of the extension of corporate negligence to MCOs as evidenced by 
the decisions in Shannon and Jones, as well as the proliferation of various 
patients’ rights initiatives throughout the United States, MCOs likely can 
expect further judicial and legislative efforts to extend corporate negligence 
principles traditionally applied to hospitals.  While corporate negligence, as it 
applies to MCOs, is still the exception rather than the rule, MCOs should 
consider undertaking risk management initiatives in line with the duties 
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enumerated in Thompson v. Nason Hospital (discussed supra), as well as 
ensuring that they comply with any availability “immunities” such as that set 
forth in HCQIA.161 
2. Contract-Based Theories 
The relationship between an MCO and its enrollees is essentially one of 
contract.162  MCOs may be exposed to liability for breach of contract or 
warranty for failing to provide benefits or pay claims that the MCO is 
obligated to provide under the terms of the agreement between the MCO and 
the enrollee.163  Breach of contract claims generally are brought by plaintiffs 
seeking to hold MCOs directly liable for provider negligence.164  While the 
majority of direct negligence claims against MCOs assert some form of breach 
of contract claim, ERISA preemption has proven to be a major hurdle for 
plaintiffs.165  Nevertheless, where plaintiffs are able to prove bad faith denial 
of bargained-for services, they may be successful in obtaining punitive and 
compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and interest.166 
Courts have held that MCOs have a legal duty to “deal fairly and in good 
faith with [subscribers], and when [they] refuse to do so without proper cause, 
[they are] liable for damages flowing therefrom.”167  In McEvoy v. Group 
Health Cooperative of Eau Claire,168 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court considered an HMO’s denial of a subscriber’s inpatient psychological 
care benefits, which were specifically provided for in the subscriber 
agreement.169  The court noted that HMO subscribers are similar to insurance 
policyholders in that they are in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis their 
HMO and, as such, may face bureaucratic and procedural hurdles in asserting 
their contractual rights.170  Given such similarities between HMOs and 
traditional insurance companies, the court extended Wisconsin’s common law 
tort of bad faith to HMOs in an effort to ensure that “HMOs do not give cost 
 
 161. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. 
 162. Brasel, supra note 110, at 466. 
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containment and utilization review such significant weight so as to disregard 
the legitimate medical needs of subscribers.”171 
The McEvoy court held that to prevail on a bad faith tort claim asserted 
against an HMO, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to show (1) “the 
absence of a reasonable basis for the HMO to deny a plaintiff’s claim for 
[contracted services, and (2)] that the HMO, in denying such claim, either 
knew or recklessly failed to ascertain that the coverage or care should have 
been provided.”172  “When a bad faith breach occurs, the HMO is liable for any 
damages which are the proximate result of that breach.”173  Should the plaintiff 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the HMO acted with fraud, 
oppression or malice, then punitive damages apply.174 
Managed care organizations also should be aware that subscribers are not 
the only potential class of plaintiffs eligible to bring breach of contract claims 
against them.  In McLachlan v. Louisiana Health Service and Indemnity Co.,175 
Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle of the Eastern District of Louisiana held that a claim 
for breach of contract by a third-party medical provider does not arise under 
ERISA.176 
In McLachlan, a physician brought a breach of contract claim against Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Louisiana (“Blue Cross”), alleging that Blue Cross 
refused to pay for services rendered by the physician.177  Blue Cross removed 
the case to Federal District Court, claiming that it fell “within the scope of 
ERISA.”178 
In remanding the case back to the First City Court of Orleans Parish, Judge 
Lemelle reasoned that “ERISA [only] preempts the state law if the plaintiff’s 
claim ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan.”179  In this case, observed Lemelle, 
the plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract against Blue Cross did not address 
a beneficiary’s right to receive benefits under the terms of a plan.180  Further, 
since plaintiff is a medical provider, his claim does not affect the relationship 
between traditional ERISA parties.181  As such, Judge Lemelle held that the 
plaintiff physician’s claim did not “relate to” an employee benefit plan and was 
not preempted by ERISA.182 
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Bad faith usually implies that an MCO should have performed a function 
or honored an agreement, but did not.  The McEvoy case and others like it 
reinforce the importance of ensuring that coverage and contractual decisions 
are based on established policies and procedures that apply to all enrollees and 
providers, and that such policies are strictly followed.  Services that are not 
covered should be communicated clearly in plan descriptions and other 
materials provided to enrollees, and only services that are covered and 
available under the plan should be promoted. 
B. Vicarious Liability 
Vicarious liability is an agency principle which makes the master liable for 
the tortious acts of his servant, despite the fact that the master has not himself 
acted negligently.183  Particularly applicable to malpractice actions (as 
discussed briefly in our analysis of the Dukes case supra), vicarious liability 
can be subdivided into theories of respondeat superior and apparent/ostensible 
agency.184 
1. Respondeat Superior 
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is vicariously 
liable for the tortious acts of an employee acting within the scope of his or her 
employment.185  The general theory behind this doctrine is that if employers 
are held liable for the negligent acts of employees, employers will have an 
incentive to invest time and resources into exercising appropriate levels of 
supervision and control over their agents, or instituting prevention measures 
necessary to reduce risk to acceptable levels.186 
A plaintiff seeking to hold an MCO liable for a physician’s (or other 
provider’s) malpractice on a theory of respondeat superior must prove that the 
physician was an employee of the MCO rather than an independent contractor 
and that the employee’s tortious behavior fell within the scope of his 
employment.187  While an MCO model which directly employs physicians, 
nurses and/or other healthcare workers (e.g., staff model HMO) is particularly 
susceptible to respondeat superior liability, courts generally will focus on the 
degree of control the MCO exercises over the provider (as opposed to whether 
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an official ‘employment” relationship exists) when determining whether 
respondeat superior liability is appropriate.188 
Given the myriad of formal and informal “relationships” that may exist 
between healthcare providers and MCOs, it is not always easy for claimants to 
prove employment relationships for purposes of establishing MCO liability 
under a theory of respondeat superior.  However, it is not necessary to prove 
that an MCO has “actual control” over a provider in order to be successful in a 
respondeat superior claim; rather, the MCO must be “in a position to control 
the physician.”189 
When deciding whether an MCO has the requisite amount of control over a 
provider such that respondeat superior liability would attach to the MCO, 
courts often will consider the manner of physician selection, physician 
discharge rights (that is, provider de-selection), quality control mechanisms 
instituted by the MCO, and the form of compensation paid to the provider.190  
Active and comprehensive utilization review mechanisms, for example, are 
evidence of an MCOs intent to exercise control over physician treatment 
decisions.191 
With respect to compensation, and absent other mitigating factors, fee-for-
service arrangements (payment for each service provided by the physician 
pursuant to a contract negotiated between the MCO and the physician at arm’s 
length) are indicative of an independent contractor relationship.192  In contrast, 
physicians receiving salary or capitation payment compensation from an MCO 
generally are regarded as employees.  In a typical salary arrangement, such as a 
staff-model HMO, the managed care organization institutes certain cost-control 
mechanisms and physicians are motivated to adhere to such mechanisms in 
order to retain their jobs and salaries.193  This degree of control over physician 
decision-making is also evident in capitation payment arrangements (fixed sum 
payment to physician for each patient per month in return for providing all 
medically necessary service), as physicians have an incentive to increase their 
profits by providing only truly necessary services.194 
2. Ostensible Agency 
Even where an independent contractor relationship is found to exist 
between an MCO and a provider, however, the MCO may, in certain 
circumstances, be found liable on an ostensible agency theory.  This doctrine 
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provides that, where an organization (an HMO or other managed care 
organization) “represents” that a healthcare provider is an agent or employee of 
the organization, and causes a patient to rely on that representation when 
submitting to care, the organization will be held liable for tortious acts of the 
healthcare provider, regardless of the fact that an independent contractor 
relationship actually exists between the organization and the provider.195 
As opposed to respondeat superior claims, the key issue in ostensible 
agency matters is not the degree of control the MCO exercises over the 
provider, but rather how the relationship between the MCO and the provider is 
represented to the health plan member.196  In Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical 
Center,197 for example, the court reversed a summary judgment order granted 
to an HMO on a state wrongful death claim, specifically noting that the HMO 
advertised its physicians as “gatekeeper[s] into the health care delivery 
system,”198 and held itself out in printed materials as a “total care program 
which not only insures its subscribers, but provides medical care, guarantees 
the quality of the care and controls the costs of health care services.”199 
The leading vicarious liability case is Dukes, which involved an ostensible 
agency claim (as well as claims for corporate negligence in selecting, 
screening, monitoring and supervising personnel) alleging vicarious liability of 
an MCO for provider malpractice.  As noted in our discussion of Dukes above, 
such malpractice claims may be viewed by courts as “quality of care” actions 
rather than denial of benefits (or, alternatively, “quantity of care”) actions, and 
thus not subject to ERISA preemption.  The impact of all of this is that 
plaintiffs can now use vicarious liability theories to expose MCOs to punitive 
and compensatory damages for the malpractice of affiliated health care 
providers. 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
Managed care organizations use a variety of mechanisms designed to 
control costs while at the same time ensuring that patients receive appropriate, 
high-quality medical care.  Most MCO litigation results from the use of such 
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mechanisms (for example, use of utilization review systems to ensure that 
medical care is necessary; establishment of protocols for pre-authorization of 
medical services, and financial incentives paid to physicians for reducing 
costs). 
When use of cost-control mechanisms results in denial of necessary 
medical care, MCOs can, in certain instances, be sued under a theory of 
vicarious liability.  It is generally well-established that ERISA preemption is 
not applicable in medical malpractice (or “quality of care”) cases.200 
If an MCO’s own corporate/administrative malfeasance leads to patient 
injury, MCOs could be subject to suit under various direct liability theories.  
However, as addressed previously, direct liability is still the exception rather 
than the rule (despite apparent trends indicating that this may not be the case 
for long), so plaintiffs face the hurdle of overcoming ERISA’s preemption 
clause which was designed to provide health care plans with freedom in 
administrative decision-making.201 
One more theory of MCO liability used by plaintiffs in their attempts to 
circumvent ERISA preemption of state law is that of breach of fiduciary 
duty.202  In furtherance of its stated purpose of establishing uniform rules for 
benefit plan administration, ERISA includes certain fiduciary duty 
provisions.203  For a plaintiff alleging breach of fiduciary duty to succeed in a 
case against an MCO, the plaintiff must establish that: (1) the MCO is a health 
plan fiduciary; (2) the MCO breached its fiduciary duty, and (3) “that a 
cognizable injury resulted.”204 
Fiduciary responsibility under ERISA is simply stated.  The statute 
provides that fiduciaries shall discharge their duties with respect to a health 
plan “solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”205  A fiduciary 
is required to discharge his duties with respect to a benefit plan for the 
exclusive purpose of (1) providing benefits to participants and their 
beneficiaries, and (2) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the 
benefit plan.206  In addition, fiduciaries must discharge their duties “with the 
care, skill, prudence, and diligence . . . that a prudent man acting in a like 
capacity . . . would use in the conduct of [a similar plan].”207 
All of this, of course, begs the questions of whether an MCO can be 
considered a plan fiduciary under ERISA and, if so, what are the practical 
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implications for such organization?  The leading case under the breach of 
fiduciary duty theory is Pegram v. Herdrich.208  The decision in Pegram 
addressed the key issue of “whether treatment decisions made by [HMOs], 
acting through their physician employees, are fiduciary acts within the 
meaning of [ERISA].”209  In the process of ruling that HMOs can provide 
certain financial incentives to network physicians without running afoul of 
ERISA’s fiduciary provisions, the Court actually might have narrowed the 
scope of ERISA’s preemption clause beyond the already stringent standard 
established in Dukes.210 
The Pegram case arose out of treatment provided to Herdrich by Dr. Lori 
Pegram, a physician-owner of an HMO.211  Dr. Pegram found a large mass in 
Herdrich’s abdomen and concluded it was an inflamed appendix.212  Rather 
than scheduling a diagnostic ultrasound at a local hospital, Herdrich alleged 
that Dr. Pegram was motivated by financial incentives to delay the procedure 
for eight days in order to have it take place in an HMO-owned facility more 
than fifty miles away.213  In the interim, Ms. Herdrich’s appendix ruptured.214 
Specifically, the Supreme Court considered Herdrich’s allegations that the 
HMO’s practice of providing year-end bonuses to its physician-owners based 
on the difference between the cost of providing medical care and HMO 
revenues created an improper incentive for such physicians to limit 
treatment.215  Herdrich, attempting to avoid ERISA preemption by suing under 
ERISA itself, argued that the HMO’s bonus policy constituted an inherent or 
anticipatory breach by the HMO of an ERISA fiduciary duty, since the terms 
of the bonus policy created an incentive for physicians to make treatment 
decisions in their own self-interest, rather than in the exclusive interest of 
benefit plan participants.216 
After undertaking an analysis of the core principles of managed care,217 the 
Court recognized that no MCO “could survive without some [form of] 
incentive connecting physician reward with treatment rationing.”218  The Court 
went on to note that “inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any 
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HMO scheme,” and that “whatever the HMO, there must be rationing and 
inducement to ration.”219  Reasoning that Congress, through its encouragement 
of HMOs, had long sanctioned such rationing of care, the Court was unable to 
justify application of ERISA’s fiduciary standards to rationing decisions.220  If 
fiduciary standards were applied, according to the Court, any decision based on 
cost rather than the best interest of the patient would be a violation of 
ERISA.221  Finding that there was no reason to believe that Congress intended 
such a result, the Court held that rationing decisions could not be subject to 
ERISA’s fiduciary rules.222 
After concluding that an MCO’s provision of financial incentives to 
physicians in an effort to control costs could not be a fiduciary act under 
ERISA, the Court took up the question of whether, in the course of 
administering the health benefits plan, certain acts of the HMO physicians 
were fiduciary in nature and, if so, whether such actions were improperly 
motivated by the MCO’s monetary incentive scheme.223  In its analysis, the 
Court focused on two types of arguably administrative acts: (1) pure 
“eligibility decisions,”224 which turn on the plan’s coverage of a particular 
condition or medical procedure for its treatment, and (2) “treatment decisions,” 
which are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s 
condition.225 
In the Court’s majority opinion, Justice Souter notes that “eligibility” 
decisions often “cannot be untangled from physicians’ judgments about 
reasonable medical treatment,” and that “[eligibility and treatment] decisions 
are often practically inextricable.”226  The Court believed that the medical 
decisions made in Ms. Herdrich’s case offered a prime example of such 
“mixed eligibility and treatment decisions.”227  In Pegram, the treating 
physician decided that “Herdrich’s condition did not warrant immediate 
action” (“treatment decision”); the consequence of such decision was a 
medical determination that the HMO “would not cover immediate care” 
(“eligibility decision”).228  According to the Court, the eligibility and treatment 
decisions in Pegram were “inextricably mixed, as they are in countless medical 
administrative decisions every day.”229 
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Turning once again to Congressional intent, the Court expressed doubt that 
Congress intended for MCOs to be treated as fiduciaries to the extent they 
make mixed treatment-eligibility decisions through their physicians.230  
Comparing common law fiduciary duties with the types of decisions involved 
in Pegram, the Court reasoned that common law “fiduciary duties 
characteristically attach to decisions about managing assets and distributing 
property to beneficiaries,” while the types of decisions made by HMOs 
(through their physicians) typically involve whether or not to provide medical 
care.231  “[W]hen Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility 
under ERISA,” according to the Court, “it concentrated on fiduciaries’ 
financial decisions” rather than the types of fiduciary duties alleged by Ms. 
Herdrich.232 
Based on the reasoning detailed above, the Court ultimately concluded that 
neither pure “treatment” decisions nor mixed treatment-eligibility decisions 
made by physicians are acts of plan administration and, therefore, ERISA’s 
fiduciary rules did not apply to such decisions.233  Only “pure eligibility” 
decisions will be considered subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duty provisions.234 
The practical effect of the Pegram decision is that most typical MCO 
functions remain beyond the reach of ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.235  While 
pure “treatment” decisions remain subject to state regulation (see this Article’s 
analysis of medical malpractice actions set forth supra), state efforts to 
regulate MCOs in their capacity as plan administrator are preempted.236 
At first glance, Pegram appears to be a major victory for MCOs (and some 
would argue that it is).237  There is debate as to whether Pegram actually has 
narrowed the scope of ERISA’s preemption of state laws regulating MCOs.238  
While the Court in Pegram found that financial incentives provided to 
physicians to control medical utilization and expenses are fundamental to the 
operation of managed care and thus are clearly allowed under ERISA, the “key 
issue may be how tightly the plan controls [physician] decision-making.”239  If, 
for example, an MCO utilized pre-approval mechanisms for the provision of 
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medical care (or any other arrangement to prospectively affect the care of an 
individual), this could be seen as a direct intervention of the MCO into medical 
decision-making and would defeat ERISA preemption.240  MCO’s choosing to 
manage medical decision-making, either directly or through “branded” medical 
groups (i.e., medical groups held out by the MCO to be agents of the MCO), 
face the enormous administrative burden of dealing with fifty different state 
laws regarding medical malpractice and fiduciary duty.241 
The ultimate reality of Pegram, then, is that it encourages MCOs to avoid 
direct management of individual patient care, instead transferring such 
responsibility to individual physicians.  By shifting decision-making risk to the 
physicians, MCOs can take full advantage of ERISA preemption of state law.  
The question for MCOs, of course, is how best to transfer such responsibility 
without losing control over costs.242 
IV.  RICO AND MANAGED CARE CLASS ACTIONS 
When Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (“RICO”)243 in 1970, its primary goal was to utilize the law 
to eradicate organized crime from the legitimate business community.  
However, in the years following its enactment, RICO has been used against 
legitimate businesses that were not in any way connected with organized 
crime.  The Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on this practice in 
Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,244 when it held ruled that RICO is not limited to 
organized crime and may be applied to legitimate businesses.245 
Section 1962 of RICO prohibits any person from, among other things, 
acquiring or maintaining through a pattern of racketeering activity an interest 
in an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, conducting or participating in 
the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce 
through a pattern of racketeering activity, or conspiring to participate in any of 
these activities.246  In addition, section 1962(a) prohibits the investment or 
improper use of money obtained from racketeering activity.247 
Racketeering is any scheme or artifice to defraud associated with a pattern 
of at least two predicate acts, which are interrelated and are not isolated events.  
Therefore, the courts require plaintiffs to show the existence of an enterprise in 
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proving that defendant(s) engaged in racketeering activity.  An enterprise 
under RICO includes any group of individuals, partnerships, corporations, 
associations or other legal entities.248  Generally, the enterprise “must exist 
independently from the racketeering activity that it engages in and must have 
some structure for the making of decisions and some mechanism for 
controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an on-going, rather than ad 
hoc, basis.”249  Typically, when the RICO defendant is a legal entity, the 
plaintiff can easily prove the existence of an enterprise because “proof that the 
entity in question has a legal existence satisfies the enterprise element.”250 
As in every other civil action, a plaintiff in a RICO claim must first 
establish standing to sue.  A RICO plaintiff has standing when the plaintiff can 
demonstrate that, as a result of defendant’s actions, plaintiff suffered an injury 
to business or property.251  In addition, bringing suit under section 1962(b) 
requires the plaintiff to show that defendant’s actions were indictable under a 
separate federal criminal statute.252  On the other hand, in order to plead a 
1962(a) claim, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered an injury as a 
result of defendant’s use of racketeer income.253  In both cases, defendant’s 
action must have been the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.254 Section 
1962(c) of RICO authorizes recovery of up to treble damages for any 
prevailing plaintiff in a civil RICO action; any person injured in “his business 
or property by reason of a violation of section 1962” may bring a civil action in 
federal court against the violator.255  In addition to the treble damage recovery, 
a private plaintiff that prevails on a RICO claim is also entitled to recover the 
cost of filing the suit and reasonable attorney’s fees.256  As such, RICO 
presents an attractive and very powerful tool to use against MCOs. 
With the general onslaught of litigation against MCOs, class actions suit 
based on RICO claims were almost inevitable.  In Humana Inc. v. Forsyth,257 
the Supreme Court opened the door for beneficiaries of MCOs to bring civil 
actions under RICO by holding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar 
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plaintiffs from bringing civil RICO claims against HMOs.258  The reason for 
this, the Court stated, is that RICO typically provides stiffer penalties for fraud, 
namely, up to treble damages, and therefore, advances the interests of the states 
in combating insurance fraud.259  The Court observed that the key factor for 
determining whether a RICO suit would impair state law in contravention of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act was the existence of a state-sanctioned private 
right of action.260  The state law in question in Humana allowed for private 
causes of action for insurance fraud.261 
Following the Humana decision, there was a wave of class action suits 
filed against MCOs alleging RICO violations.  The plaintiffs in these suits 
have experienced a number of difficulties in maintaining their suits against 
MCOs, including difficulties establishing standing, proving the predicate acts 
necessary to support a RICO claim, or—the Humana decision 
notwithstanding—showing that maintaining a private cause of action does not 
violate relevant state law. 
A. The McCarran-Ferguson Limitation 
American Chiropractic Association v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc.262 involved 
a group of individual doctors and a chiropractic association who alleged 
extortion and conspiracy to eliminate the practice of chiropractic medicine by 
way of an MCO’s exclusion of such services from its health insurance 
policies.263  The plaintiffs then alleged violations of federal laws, including 
RICO, as well as violations of the Virginia Insurance Code.264  The court found 
that the state law in question, unlike that in Humana, limited the private rights 
of action for insurance claims, and therefore, allowing the plaintiffs to bring a 
RICO cause of action against the insurance company “would not only ‘impair’ 
the [state] regulation but would [also] ‘supercede’ the state law at issue” in 
violation of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.265 
B. Establishing Predicate Acts 
In Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc.,266 the plaintiff was a 
psychiatrist who sued a managed care organization under a variety of theories, 
including RICO, claiming that he had been “blacklisted” by the defendant 
“because he insisted on procedures and treatments for patients [that the 
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defendant MCO] did not [want] to cover.”267  To support his RICO claim, 
plaintiff alleged that defendant had committed extortion in violation of the 
Hobbs Act and wire fraud by threatening to cancel a contract with the hospital 
for whom plaintiff worked if plaintiff persisted in “making trouble.”268  In 
addition, plaintiff alleged that the defendant MCO pressured the hospital into 
using other psychiatrists, other than the plaintiff, for patients covered under 
defendant’s insurance.269  The court found that plaintiff’s allegations failed to 
satisfy the requirement of the Hobbs Act because he had no right to treat any of 
the denied patients and thus no right to the fees that plaintiff claimed were 
being extorted through the MCO’s threats of canceling its contract with the 
hospital.270  The court, therefore, dismissed the case on motion since plaintiff 
could not establish the predicate acts to support the RICO claim.271 
C. The Standing Issue 
Among the first wave of cases filed after the Humana decision was Maio v. 
Aetna Inc.,272 certified as a class action on behalf of “[then] present and former 
Aetna HMO members who, as a group, were targeted by Aetna and induced 
into enrolling in Aetna’s HMO.”273  Although the plaintiffs alleged a variety of 
“criminal” acts to satisfy the requirements of RICO, their main allegation was 
that the defendant HMO had committed fraud (wire fraud and insurance fraud) 
by falsely representing that its members would receive “high quality health 
care from physicians who [would be] solely responsible for . . . maintaining the 
physician-patient relationship,”274 when, in fact, the HMO’s policy was to 
restrict a physician’s ability to provide high quality health care.  In addition, 
plaintiffs alleged that defendant HMO had misrepresented the extent of the 
coverage that would be provided under the plan and, as a result, plaintiffs were 
induced to enroll in defendant’s health care plan.275  The RICO injury, 
plaintiffs claimed, was the diminishment in the market value of the health care 
plans, as a result of defendants’ undisclosed agreement with plaintiffs’ health 
care providers restricting coverage.276 
The court disagreed and dismissed the case on defendant’s motion, and the 
trial court’s decision was later upheld on appeal.277  It found that plaintiffs had 
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not pleaded enough facts to support the allegation that they had suffered a 
present injury since plaintiffs could not point to specific instances where 
plaintiffs had “suffered negative medical consequences resulting from Aetna’s 
enactment of the policies and practices at issue.”278 
In the court’s view, plaintiffs’ claims of injury rested solely on factual 
speculation as to whether their contracts would have been breached had they 
requested benefits.279  The court found that plaintiffs’ property interest in the 
HMO was “not a tangible property interest, like a plot of land,” but rather was 
merely a “contractual right to receive benefits in the form of covered medical 
services.”280  The court cited Judge Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion in Oscar v. 
University Students Co-Operative Association281 for the proposition that, 
where property interests are in the form of contractual rights, economic injury 
could not stem from a reduction in value.282  The court held that plaintiffs’ 
insurance policy was a contract, and, therefore, the court concluded that any 
injuries that plaintiffs might have suffered would have to be resolved under 
contract law.283  Plaintiff could only prove an injury by alleging facts to show 
that the defendant HMO had breached its agreement with plaintiff by providing 
less service than they had contracted for. 
In Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc.,284 the Ninth Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion to that of the Third Circuit in Maio.  It found that plaintiff 
failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a claim under section 1962(a) of the 
RICO Act because plaintiff could not establish that he had been driven out of 
business or harmed in any direct way as a result of defendants’ use or 
investment of income from racketeering activity.285  Similarly, plaintiff’s 
1962(c) and 1962(d) claims could not stand because plaintiff did not allege, 
and could not establish the existence, of an enterprise among the defendants.286  
The court found that ‘“a conspiracy is not an enterprise for . . . purposes of 
RICO;’”287 rather, plaintiff must prove that an enterprise existed independent 
of the racketeering activity and had a structure for controlling and directing 
decisions. 
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The violations alleged in In re Managed Care Litigation288 are almost 
identical to those alleged in Maio.  Unlike the Maio and the Simon courts, 
however, Judge Moreno, in In re Managed Care, found that the plaintiffs had 
alleged sufficient facts to establish standing to sue under the RICO Act.289  
Judge Moreno disagreed with the Maio court’s “dichotomy between property 
interests and contracts and [the conclusion] that the subscriber plaintiffs . . . 
possessed only contractual [interests] . . . in their insurance coverage.”290  To 
Judge Moreno, “the Maio court took an overly restrictive view of property 
rights and overlooked the distinction between business-related torts and 
contract breaches.”291  Plaintiffs’ claim was for fraudulent inducement, ‘“an 
independent tort in that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from the 
breach of contract.’”292  In the court’s view “a person whose property is 
diminished by a payment of money wrongfully induced is injured in his [or 
her] property” as required by the RICO statute.293  As for the speculative 
nature of plaintiffs’ injuries, the court found that the tortious injury was 
suffered at the time they enrolled in the plans and that it was not necessary to 
wait until the defendant MCOs denied coverage before allowing the suit to 
stand.294 
On February 20, 2002, Judge Moreno dismissed with prejudice all of the 
RICO claims for ten of the sixteen subscriber track plaintiffs.295 While the 
court found that all of the plaintiffs had adequately pled claims under RICO, 
the court found that the McCarran-Ferguson Act required dismissal with 
prejudice of the claims of ten of the subscriber track plaintiffs because the Act 
prohibits federal lawsuits that encroach on state regulatory decision making.296  
Since the laws regulating the insurance industry in Florida, New Jersey, 
California and Virginia, where those ten plaintiffs lived, did not provide 
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private civil remedies for victims of insurance fraud, allowing the RICO claims 
of those plaintiffs in those states to go forward would encroach on those states’ 
regulatory decision making.297 
As a result of Judge Moreno’s ruling, the remaining claims in the 
Subscriber Track Cases are 
(1) the RICO claims of those plaintiffs who reside in states that 
recognize a private cause of action for insurance fraud, (2) all of the 
ERISA claims alleging interference with physician-patient 
communication as a breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) the 
misrepresentation of “medical necessity” breach of fiduciary duty 
claims of those plaintiffs who no longer subscribe to the defendants’ 
health care plans.298 
In re Managed Care Litigation, nevertheless, remains a concern for MCOs in 
that Moreno seems to have disregarded earlier impediments to plaintiff 
standing.  It would appear, then, that so long as RICO plaintiffs can overcome 
McCarran-Ferguson Act limitations, they have a legitimate chance to receive 
class certification. 
V.  EMERGING AREAS OF LIABILITY 
Given the general trend towards increased liability for MCOs highlighted 
throughout this article, certain legal theories of liability which previously 
presented obstacles to plaintiffs seeking to recover damages from MCOs may 
receive additional attention from the plaintiffs’ bar and the judicial bench.  
This section focuses on three such areas of “emerging” liability: antitrust, 
provider deselection and negligent credentialing. 
A. Antitrust 
Despite the dominance of managed care in a large number of markets, 
antitrust litigation directly concerning managed care represents only a small 
percentage of total medical antitrust cases resulting in opinions.299  Generally 
speaking, courts have applied antitrust law so as to allow MCOs room to 
achieve their cost containment and management objectives.300  There are 
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reasons to suspect, however, that managed care antitrust litigation will increase 
in the future.301 
In their study of health care antitrust litigation, law professors William M. 
Sage (Columbia University) and Peter J. Hammer (University of Michigan) 
indicate that “waves of consolidation” within the managed care industry are 
leading to levels of horizontal concentration which are likely to draw increased 
antitrust scrutiny.302  Furthermore, if economic conditions continue to worsen, 
MCOs may turn increasingly to exclusive provider networks, prompting 
heightened antitrust scrutiny even at relatively low levels of economic 
concentration.303  Finally, the expansion of managed care into smaller 
communities and the resulting increase of market concentration likely will 
expose MCOs and their contracting partners to additional antitrust liability.304 
One recent case which received a great deal of attention involved 
allegations of predatory pricing leveled by a health insurer, Coventry Health 
Care of Kansas, Inc., (hereinafter “Coventry”), against Via Christi Health 
System, Inc., a Wichita, Kansas based health system that owns a hospital, Via 
Christi Regional Medical Center, and a health insurer, Preferred Health 
Systems (hereinafter “Preferred”).305  The case, Coventry Health Care of 
Kansas, Inc. v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., was heralded by some as “the 
beginning of a new wave of antitrust actions by health insurers seeking to 
challenge market conditions they considered disadvantageous.”306 
In Coventry, Raytheon Aircraft Company, the third-largest employer in 
Wichita, was informed by its health insurer, Coventry, that Raytheon’s health 
insurance rates would increase 31% upon renewal of its health plan agreement 
with Coventry commencing January 1, 2002.307  Facing such a stiff increase in 
premiums, Raytheon solicited bids for its health insurance account from 
Preferred and from Blue Cross of Kansas.308  After considering all bids and 
further negotiation with Coventry, Raytheon ultimately awarded its account to 
Preferred at a cost savings to Raytheon (as compared to the Coventry proposal) 
of approximately $31 million.309 
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Fearing that its loss of the Raytheon contract would impair its ability to 
stay in the Wichita market, Coventry filed suit against Via Christi and 
Preferred challenging the award of the contract to Preferred.310  Coventry 
argued that Preferred attempted to monopolize the Wichita “HMO/POS . . . 
benefit plan” product market,311 and alleged that Via Christi engaged in 
predatory pricing by offering Preferred (a subsidiary of Via Christi) a “below 
cost” reimbursement rate.312  According to Coventry, this predatory price 
allowed Preferred to win the Raytheon contract.313 
In its decision, the Coventry court pointed out that a plaintiff claiming 
attempted monopolization by predatory pricing must prove: “(1) a relevant 
geographic and product market; (2) specific intent of the defendants to 
monopolize the market; (3) anti-competitive conduct by the defendants in 
furtherance of [such] attempt, and (4) the dangerous probability that the 
defendants will succeed in such attempt.”314  After reviewing a significant 
amount of evidence, and after considering the analysis of economic experts on 
each side, the court ultimately concluded that Coventry could not prove any of 
the four elements required to sustain a claim of predatory pricing, finding 
instead that Preferred’s bid simply reflected, among other things, Preferred’s 
“lower level of physician costs” and Coventry’s “higher administrative 
costs.”315 
Coventry was unable to show antitrust injury by proving anticompetitive 
effect in the relevant market, as evidence showed that the Wichita area 
continued to be served by a variety of health insurers after the Raytheon 
contract was awarded to Preferred.  In fact, Coventry remained a viable 
competitor after it lost the Raytheon contract. 316  Significant for integrated 
delivery systems, the court noted that despite the affiliation between Via 
Christi and Preferred, it found nothing unusual in the communications between 
the two affiliates with respect to the Raytheon contract which would suggest 
intent to monopolize.317  Specifically, the court recognized the failure of 
Coventry to prove “backdoor” communications between Via Christi and 
Preferred, and noted that the affiliates appeared to operate “independently” and 
that boards of directors were kept distinct and separate (no overlap of 
members).318 
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It is clear from Coventry that plaintiffs claiming predatory pricing face 
significant evidentiary hurdles in proving such claims.  As managed care 
encroaches into smaller markets which may be served by only a limited 
number of insurers, however, it may be easier for plaintiffs to prove 
anticompetitive injury and irreparable harm. 
In a very recent case, Women’s Clinic, Inc. v. St. John’s Health System, 
Inc., the Western District of Missouri followed the judicial trend apparent in 
Coventry by once again applying antitrust law in a manner which permitted the 
MCOs to contain costs and reach their management objectives.319  Plaintiff, 
Women’s Clinic, Inc. (hereinafter “Women’s Clinic”), alleged that St. John’s 
Health Systems, Inc., and St. John’s Physicians and Clinics, Inc. (hereinafter 
“St. John’s), a network of health care providers, engaged in anticompetitive 
behavior in violation of state and federal antitrust laws by integrating its health 
care network through exclusive contracts and by entering into a Business 
Covenant with Women’s Clinic physicians which prohibited the Women’s 
Clinic physicians from “investing in or operating surgical centers, birthing 
centers, mammography clinics, or other operations for which the physicians 
could charge a facility fee.”320 
In Women’s Clinic, St. John’s, in an effort to develop its multi-provider 
network, purchased Women’s Clinic and made the plaintiff physicians 
employees of St. John’s.321  Pursuant to this agreement, the plaintiff physicians 
signed covenants not to compete with St. John’s if the physicians should leave 
the St. John’s network.322  For several years, the relationship between the 
parties was favorable, and Women’s Clinic benefited from their affiliations 
with St. John’s.323  During St. John’s restructuring of its network in 1999, St. 
John’s permitted Women’s Clinic to repurchase the clinic, without the surgery 
center and the mammography clinic.324  As part of the sale, the parties entered 
a Business Covenant which provided that “for a term of five years, plaintiff 
physicians could practice medicine in the Springfield area, but could not invest 
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in or operate any ambulatory surgical center, birthing center, and freestanding 
lab or diagnostic service clinic including mammography and ultrasound.”325 
The Women’s Clinic court granted summary judgment on all four counts in 
St. John’s favor.326  In response to Women’s Clinic’s first claim that St. John’s 
“exclusive” vertical integration is an unlawful restraint of trade, the court held 
that Women’s Clinic did not demonstrate the necessary showing that the 
“exclusive agreements between St. John’s and its payors actually, 
detrimentally, impact[ed] competition” or that St. John’s had sufficient market 
power.327  The court relied on the fact that the agreements were not, in fact, 
“exclusive” because they did not prohibit its payors from paying individual 
enrollees for services they receive outside the network and they did not 
prohibit payors from leaving St. John’s network to contract with a competitor 
network.328 
The court denied Women’s Clinic’s second count that the Business 
Covenant between plaintiffs and St. John’s acted as a horizontal market 
allocation in violation of antitrust laws.329  According to the court, the Business 
Covenant was ancillary to the Transition Agreement associated with the sale of 
the clinic to plaintiffs, and was necessary for the plaintiff physicians to practice 
medicine and to “ensure a successful transition from employees to affiliates” 
for Women’s Clinic.330 
Further, Women’s Clinic was unable to show antitrust violations under 
Missouri law, which considers a covenant not to compete to be unreasonable 
if, “in addition to being ancillary to a valid underlying agreement, the covenant 
is not reasonably limited in scope to protecting the covenatee’s legitimate 
interest.”331  The essential fault with Women’s Clinic’s argument was that its 
claims were based on the erroneous notion that the relationship between 
plaintiffs and St. John’s was an employee-employer relationship.332  Women’s 
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Clinic was unable to persuade the court that declaratory relief was appropriate 
because Women’s Clinic failed to request that the that court construe the terms 
of the affiliation agreement and that alternative remedies were available.333 
Similar to Coventry, Women’s Clinic demonstrates the difficulties placed 
in the paths of plaintiffs seeking to prove their claims of antitrust violations by 
managed care networks. 
B. Provider Deselection 
As managed care has evolved into the predominant form of healthcare 
delivery in the United States, physician-patient relationships have inevitably 
been affected by the business realities of the managed care framework.334  The 
twin objectives of maximizing profit and controlling cost often force MCOs to 
terminate physician contracts in an effort to adjust their provider bases for 
efficient provision of care.335  This is particularly true in the case of physicians 
who, in the judgment of MCO medical directors, over utilize managed care 
services or consistently appeal denial of care decisions.336  This process of 
terminating physician contracts and removing such physicians from MCO 
provider panels is known as “deselection.”337 
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jeopardy.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002) (stating that “deselection of specific providers can occur 
as a result of cost cutting activities and/or economic credentialing resulting in a ‘weeding out’ 
process. Recently, MetLife cut 1,100 physicians in southern Florida, Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
dropped 3,000 physicians, including the providers deselected from these and other MCOs, over 
5,000 physicians have experienced deselection, potentially resulting in an over-abundance of 
providers seeking membership to managed care panels.”). 
 337. Richard S. Liner, Physician Deselection: The Dynamics of a New Threat to the 
Physician-Patient Relationship, 23 AM. J.L. & MED, 511, 513 (1997).  See also Judith C. 
Brostron, Physician Deselection in Managed Care Contracts, at http://www.lashlybaer.com/itn/ 
sfb/spring99html#physician (last visited Oct. 7, 2002). 
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Provider deselection is based in contract and typically is accomplished 
through the use of “termination without cause” provisions.338  Such 
“termination without cause” clauses, which are almost universally present in 
physician/MCO provider agreements, generally allow either party to terminate 
the contract at any time without reason.339  This “at will” contractual 
relationship between physicians and MCOs provides MCOs with the ability to 
control healthcare costs by regulating their provider panels as needed.340 
1. Physician Challenges to Deselection: The Harper Case 
Until the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s decision in Harper v. 
Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc.,341 physicians who challenged termination 
without cause generally were denied relief on the grounds that, absent unfair 
procedures, such contract clauses were valid and enforceable.342  In 1997, 
however, the Harper court reversed this trend, expressly supporting judicial 
intervention into MCO-physician relationships and allowing a physician to 
proceed with an action to invalidate the termination without cause provision of 
a provider agreement.343 
In Harper, Dr. Paul Harper, a board certified surgeon, sued the HMO, 
Healthsource New Hampshire, Inc. (“Healthsource”), after Healthsource 
terminated their contractual relationship because Dr. Harper failed to satisfy 
the HMO’s “recredentialing criteria.”344  At the time of the lawsuit, Dr. Harper 
had been a practicing physician with Healthsource for over ten years and 
approximately 30-40% of his patients were Healthsource related.345 
 
 338. Liner, supra note 337, at 513. 
 339. See Liang, supra note 334, at 801 (citing Howard Larkin, You’re Fired; Physician 
Termination, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 13, 1995, at 17). 
 340. Jurgeleit, supra note 336 (citing Alan Somers, What You and Your Physician Client 
Need to Know About Managed Care Contracts, PRAC. LAW., Mar. 1996, at 15, 26-27).  See also 
Lisa J. Bernt, Wrongful Discharge of Independent Contractors: A Source-Derivative Approach to 
Deciding Who May Bring a Claim for Violation of Public Policy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 39 
(2000)). 
 341. 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996). 
 342. Liang, supra note 334, at 808 n.38 (stating that “many physicians have been reported to 
be deselected but there have been no successful published challenges to these terminations except 
under anti-discrimination laws.”) (citing Ken Terry, When Health Plans Don’t Want You 
Anymore, MED. ECON., May 23, 1994; Julie Johnson, Hospital Medical Staffs: Next Managed 
Care Casualty?, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1).  The decisions that granted relief 
generally focused on ensuring that deselected physicians received fair procedures.  See, e.g., 
Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying fair procedures 
theory to a provider deselected from a managed care company and ruling that a managed care 
company cannot terminate a provider for arbitrary or capricious reasons). 
 343. Harper, 674 A.2d at 966-67. 
 344. Id. at 963. 
 345. Id. 
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The provider agreement between Dr. Harper and Healthsource contained a 
termination without cause provision pursuant to which the agreement could be 
“terminated by either party without cause upon six (6) months prior written 
notice.”346  After exhausting internal challenges of Healthsource’s decision to 
terminate his provider agreement, Dr. Harper challenged his termination in 
court.  Dr. Harper claimed that the termination without cause provision in the 
provider agreement was against public policy, and, thus, void.347 
Citing previous application of public policy issues to hospitals,348 the court 
in Harper extended the public policy argument to contractual relationships 
between HMOs and physicians.349  The court observed that, as is the case with 
hospitals, the “public has a substantial interest in the relationship between 
health maintenance organizations and their preferred provider physicians. . . . 
This relationship is perhaps the most important factor in linking a particular 
physician with a particular patient.”350  The court went on to rule that public 
interest and fundamental fairness require that MCOs comply with an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when terminating provider agreements, 
and that such terminations not be contrary to public policy.351  Accordingly, 
the court concluded that, while an MCO has a contractual right to terminate a 
provider agreement without cause, the terminated physician is entitled to a 
review of such decision if “the physician believes that the decision to terminate 
was . . . made in bad faith or based on a factor that would make the decision 
contrary to public policy.”352 
2. Post-Harper Developments 
The Harper decision was seen by physicians as a victory against the 
termination of provider agreements by MCOs,353 and it opened a new avenue 
of MCO liability by permitting challenges to physician deselection based on 
public policy arguments.354  Subsequent to Harper, for example, in New Jersey 
 
 346. Id. at 964. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Harper, 674 A.2d at 966. (The court observed that “the public has a substantial interest 
in the operation of private hospitals and that of necessity in the public interest some measure of 
control by the courts is controlled for.”) (quoting Bricker v. Sceva Speare Mem’l Hosp., 281 A.2d 
589, 592 (N.H. 1971)). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. Id. (observing that the “provider agreements must be ‘fair and in the public interest’”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 352. Id.  See also Liang, supra note 334, for a detailed analysis of the Harper decision. 
 353. Mark A. Kadzielski, Provider Deselection and Decapitation in a Changing Healthcare 
Environment, 41 ST. LOUIS L.J. 891, 903 (1997).  See also Ken Terry, supra note 335 (discussing 
state level efforts to address deselection). 
 354. Kadzielski, supra note 353, at 904 (citing New Hampshire Decision Could Inspire Suits 
Over “Without Cause” Exclusions, 5 HEALTH L. REP., June 13, 1996, at d49).  See also Liang 
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Psychological Association v. MCC Behavioral Care, Inc., providers terminated 
by the largest MCO in New Jersey challenged termination without cause 
provisions in their provider agreements.355  The court compared the 
termination of qualified physicians by MCOs to hospital termination of 
physician staff privileges.356  Finding that public policy considerations were 
similar in the two instances (MCOs delivery of healthcare to the public and 
MCO employment of physicians), the court held that physicians were entitled 
to a fair hearing before termination of their provider agreements by MCOs.357 
Later, in Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co..,358 a California 
obstetrician challenged his removal from a health plan’s preferred provider list 
pursuant to a termination without cause provision.359  Dr. Potvin argued that 
his removal from the preferred provider list was devastating to his practice as it 
substantially reduced his patient base.360  In light of this allegation, the Potvin 
court observed that an insurance company may, in certain circumstances, have 
sufficient market power to “impair an ordinary, competent physician’s ability 
to practice medicine . . . in a particular geographical area, thereby affecting an 
important, substantial economic interest.”361  Accordingly, the court held Dr. 
Potvin’s termination without cause provision unenforceable and ruled that 
deselection, at least where the MCO has strong market presence, must be “both 
substantively rational and procedurally fair.”362 
It is important to note that treatment of the Harper and Potvin decisions 
has not been uniform.  For instance, in Grossman v. Columbine Medical 
Group, Inc.,363 the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the Harper and Potvin 
public policy arguments, holding that the Colorado legislation on the issue was 
dispositive of the state’s public policy.364  The court noted that the Colorado 
law specifically allowing termination without cause provisions in provider 
agreements between MCOs and physicians was not applicable due to its 
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enactment subsequent to the termination of the contract in the current case.365  
However, the court found the statute instructive in its determination of public 
policy on the issue, and reasoned that the right to terminate without cause 
applies equally to both the MCO and the physician.366  The court went on to 
reason that “the physician cannot rely on the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing to circumvent terms for which he expressly bargained,”367 and, as 
such, the Grossman court denied the challenge of the termination without 
cause provision.368 
3. Reducing Liability Exposure for Deselection Decisions 
In light of the Harper and Potvin decisions, MCOs need to carefully 
consider and document their deselection decisions. While the Harper and 
Potvin decisions are not uniformly supported, they may indicate a trend of 
increased judicial scrutiny in deselection actions.  In light of court decisions 
favorable to physicians, and given the very serious business, financial and 
professional ramifications that deselection can have on providers (including 
loss of income, decrease in established patient base and potential increases in 
malpractice insurance premiums), deselected physicians are likely to 
vigorously challenge MCO deselection decisions. 369 
A consistent pattern of physician deselection for over utilization of 
managed care resources is “an invitation for litigation,” unless an MCO 
demonstrates other justifiable reasons for same.370  To avoid costly and 
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prolonged litigation battles with terminated physicians, MCOs should first 
consider whether termination can be supported by a “termination with cause” 
provision in the provider agreement.  If a termination without cause provision 
must be invoked, MCOs need to be prepared to: (1) demonstrate objective 
reasons for deselection; (2) show that the decision is not made in bad faith and 
is not contrary to public policy, and (3) follow a well-documented and 
objective termination process which will withstand judicial scrutiny if the 
termination decision is challenged by a physician.371  It is also important that 
the deselection process be applied consistently to all physicians and that a 
deselected physician be given notice and reasons for deselection.  Affected 
providers should be given an opportunity to meet with the MCO’s governing 
body to discuss the situation before a final decision is made, and the 
deselection process should be thoroughly documented to prevent any future 
allegations of arbitrary or bad faith decisions to deselect.372 
C. Utilization Review 
One cost containment measure employed by MCOs to combat rising 
healthcare costs involves a process termed “utilization review,” whereby 
MCOs or their agents (1) prospectively monitor and evaluate the medical 
necessity of a physician’s prescribed treatments (including diagnostic 
evaluations or admission of patients to hospitals and other facilities), and (2) 
determine if the treatment is covered by the patient’s policy.373  Utilization 
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review generally is performed by medical personnel such as nurses or doctors 
employed by the MCO as case reviewers, with the MCO’s medical director 
overseeing all determinations.374  During the process of utilization review, if 
the MCO or its medical director determines that a particular treatment 
prescribed by the patient’s treating physician is not “medically necessary,” the 
MCO denies coverage for the treatment.375  While MCOs argue that utilization 
review is solely administrative,376 courts have recognized that, due to the cost 
of many medical procedures, the true effect of the MCO’s decision to deny 
payment can be to “limit the length of hospital stays, restrict the use of 
specialists, prohibit or limit post hospital care, restrict access to therapy, or 
prevent rendering of emergency room care.”377 
Litigation based upon utilization review is an emerging and highly 
unsettled area of the law.378  This section aims to briefly describe the area of 
law as it stands today and to describe  trends affecting MCO liability. 
Most claims against MCOs with regard to utilization review are direct 
liability claims.379 As with nearly all cases against MCOs, ERISA preemption 
provides an initial hurdle for any suit based upon utilization review.  Only 
when the patient can successfully base his or her claim on the quality of 
medical benefits provided by the MCO, as opposed to the quantity of benefits 
owed to the patient under the MCO plan, will the suit survive ERISA 
preemption.380 
While nearly all courts have held that ERISA preempts direct negligence 
claims based upon a denial of benefits through utilization review,381 in 1999, 
the Third Circuit, in In re United States Healthcare, Inc., 382 held that ERISA 
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did not preempt a decedent’s parent’s direct negligence claim against an MCO 
which denied benefits after utilization review.383  In this case, Michelle 
Bauman and her newborn daughter, Michelina, were discharged from the 
hospital twenty-four hours after Michelina’s birth as required under their MCO 
plan.384  One day later, Michelina contracted a virulent infection.385  The 
treating physician failed to advise the Baumans to bring their daughter back to 
the hospital and U.S. Healthcare, the MCO, declined to provide a home visit 
from a pediatric nurse requested by Ms. Bauman.386  Michelina died later that 
same day.387 
The Baumans sued the physician, the hospital and the MCO based upon a 
number of legal theories, some of which were based upon the direct negligence 
of the MCO with regard to its various utilization review policies.388  The court 
noted that an HMO may assume both a role as an administrator of the plan and 
a separate role as a provider of medical services.389  The court acknowledged 
that ERISA completely preempts claims based upon an MCO’s administrative 
activities, but determined that in this case, the decedent’s parents were basing 
their claim upon the medical determination by the MCO of the appropriate 
level of care provided and not a claim that a certain benefit was requested and 
denied.390  As such, the court actually attempted to follow the quality versus 
quantity distinction discussed earlier in this Article, but reached the opposite 
conclusion than that of other Circuits which have addressed the same issue.391 
An in-depth discussion of all issues that might arise with regard to the 
direct liability of MCOs based upon utilization review is beyond the scope of 
this Article.  However, assuming a plaintiff can successfully escape ERISA 
preemption by claiming a deficiency in the quality of medical care provided, 
the following causes of action have been successfully asserted, or could likely 
be successfully asserted sometime in the future, against MCOs for such 
claims.392 
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1. Negligence 
In order to establish negligence against an MCO, a patient must show that 
the MCO “owed the [patient] a duty of reasonable care, that the [MCO] 
breached the duty, . . . that the breach proximately caused the [patient’s] 
injury,” and that the patient suffered actual damage as a result of the breach.393  
Whether the MCO owes a duty to the patient depends in great part on whether 
it is foreseeable that the patient may forego treatment if the MCO denies 
authorization.394  Courts are likely to find that a duty exists and that the 
utilization review decision is often the decisive factor for the patient in 
determining whether the patient will forego treatment.395 
There can be two separate duties of care applied depending on whether the 
alleged negligence is due to a defect in the MCO’s procedures or in the MCO’s 
substantive medical decisions.  The standard of care applied for the procedural 
aspects of conducting the utilization review is likely to be based on the 
standard of care in the community of reviewing agents, and the “[utilization 
review] procedures must be sufficient to obtain enough information to make an 
informed decision and to enable a timely dialogue and/or appeal if the treating 
physician or patient disagrees.”396  Because MCOs use the expertise of 
physicians during utilization review to evaluate claims, the standard of care 
used to judge the substantive decision of whether or not a given treatment is 
medically necessary will likely be the same as for physicians generally.397  The 
MCO should authorize treatment if a treating physician exercising the 
community standard of care would deem the treatment medically necessary.398 
Negligence is probably the most common cause of action asserted by 
patients against MCOs with regard to utilization review,399 and some courts 
have determined that a patient can successfully sue under such a theory.400  For 
example, in Wickline v. State,401 the MCO, through its utilization review 
process, allegedly influenced the treating physician’s medical judgment, 
causing a premature discharge of a patient from the hospital that led to the 
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amputation of the patient’s leg.402  The court determined that the treating 
physician should bear ultimate responsibility for the loss of the patient’s leg, 
and not the MCO, because the physician discharged the patient and did not 
protest the MCO’s decision to deny payment for an extended stay in the 
hospital.403  However, the court acknowledged that: 
Third party payors of health care services can be held legally accountable 
when medically inappropriate decisions result from defects in the design or 
implementation of cost-containment mechanisms as, for example, when 
appeals made on a patient’s behalf for medical or hospital care are arbitrarily 
ignored or unreasonably disregarded or overridden.404 
2. Breach of Contract 
Policies between the MCO and patient are contracts, and as such, the 
wrongful denial of payment authorization through utilization review can 
subject the MCO to liability under contract theories such as breach of contract 
and breach of warranty.405  However, if the patient argues only that the MCO 
breached its contract with the patient by wrongfully denying payment for 
treatments that should have been covered under the policy, the claim likely will 
be completely preempted by ERISA and dismissed as a state law breach of 
contract claim.406  Moreover, even if the case were to escape ERISA 
preemption, the damages potentially available to the patient under a breach of 
contract theory are limited to those damages reasonably foreseeable from the 
breach.407  Punitive damages are unavailable.408 
3. Medical Malpractice 
While the entire area of MCO liability based upon utilization review is an 
area of uncertainty,409 states and courts are especially split on the front of 
whether MCOs can and should be liable to patients for medical malpractice.410  
For a patient to successfully assert a medical malpractice claim against a 
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defendant, the patient must prove the four elements of general negligence411 
that there was a physician-patient relationship, and that the defendant was 
engaged in the practice of medicine.412  The key issue then, in determining 
whether a plaintiff can successfully sue an MCO directly for medical 
malpractice, is whether utilization review is the practice of medicine.413 
Historically, patients could not successfully sue MCOs for medical 
malpractice due to the “corporate practice of medicine doctrine,” which has 
been codified in some states.414  The doctrine generally bars corporations and 
other entities from the practice of medicine “because only a human being can 
have the [proper] education, training, and character necessary to receive a 
professional license and treat patients.”415 
However, the American Medical Association has stated, “utilization 
review decisions to deny payment for medically necessary care constitute the 
practice of medicine.”416 In recent years, the state medical licensing boards or 
attorneys general in California, Louisiana, Minnesota, South Carolina and 
Texas have all expressed a similar view.417  In so doing, each state has 
potentially opened up an avenue for patients to sue the MCO directly for 
medical malpractice.  In addition, there is strong support in these states for the 
position that physicians acting as medical directors in utilization review must 
be licensed to practice medicine in the state and that there will be significant 
penalties for those physicians who conduct utilization review without a 
license.418 
Many states, however, have taken the opposing view.  Arkansas, Kansas, 
Mississippi, North Carolina and Ohio have all seemingly relied on the 
 
 411. See supra note 393 and accompanying text (outlining four elements of a negligence 
cause of action). 
 412. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 135. 
 413. Id. at 108.  It is also important to note that in certain states which have decided that 
utilization review is the practice of medicine, the MCO and its medical directors may not only be 
liable for traditional medical malpractice suits by plaintiff/patients, but would also be subject to 
review and discipline by the state’s medical board.  Id. 
 414. Id. at 136. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 108 (citing AMA House of 
Delegates, H-285.939, Managed Care Medical Director Liability, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ 
apps_pfonline/pf_online?f_n=resultLink&doc=policyfiles/HOD/H285.939.HTM&s_t= 285.939& 
catg=AMA/HOD&&nth=1&&st_p=0&nth=1& (last visited Jan. 17, 2002)). 
 417. See id. at 113-16.  It should be noted that the authors have not engaged in a fifty state 
research of state medical licensing board opinions or attorneys’ general opinions and have relied 
upon the cited reference in this determination.  There may be additional states which share the 
same view. 
 418. Id. at 109. 
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traditional definition of medicine419 and have determined that utilization 
review is not the practice of medicine.420  The Ohio Medical Board went so far 
as to say that “the actions of a medical director must be the action of the 
corporation and therefore cannot be the practice of medicine.”421 
As noted above, while most cases against MCOs with regard to utilization 
review are direct liability claims, patients often attempt to assert vicarious 
liability claims against MCOs for medical malpractice and negligence of their 
physicians.  Some courts have not allowed medical malpractice claims against 
MCOs to proceed for the same reason direct malpractice claims could not 
proceed: the court does not acknowledge that the MCO is practicing medicine.  
As such, these courts have held that the MCO cannot be held vicariously liable 
for medical malpractice, a cause of action for which the practice of medicine is 
an essential element.422 However, if such a case is brought in a state which 
does consider utilization review the practice of medicine, the court would 
seemingly allow the vicarious liability medical malpractice case to proceed 
against the MCO. 
4. Tortious Interference with Physician-Patient Relationship 
In order to successfully bring a claim of tortious interference with the 
physician-patient relationship, the patient would need to prove the existence 
and the MCO’s knowledge of the physician-patient relationship between the 
patient and a treating physician, the MCO’s intentional interference with the 
relationship and actual breach of it, and damages caused to the patient because 
of such interference.423  While no successful cases have apparently been 
brought under this cause of action based upon utilization review,424 a patient 
 
 419. The traditional definition of practicing medicine only includes, for example, examining, 
“diagnosing, operating on, prescribing for, administering to or treating [a patient’s] ailment, 
injury or deformity.”  Id. at 110 (citing 60 N.C. Op. Att’y Gen. 49 (1990)). 
 420. See id. at 109-13.  It again should be noted that the authors have not engaged in a fifty 
state research of state medical licensing board opinions or attorneys’ general opinions and have 
relied upon the cited reference in this determination.  There may be additional states which share 
the same view. 
 421. Trueman, Liability of Medical Directors, supra note 373, at 137 (citing 1999 Ohio Op. 
Att’y Gen. No. 99-044, at 5 (1999), available at http://www.ag.state.oh.us/opinions/1999/99-
044.htm). 
 422. See, e.g., Dalton v. Peninsula Hosp. Ctr., 626 N.Y.S.2d 362, 364 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 1995); 
Freedman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Colo., 849 P.2d 811, 816 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993); 
Propst v. Health Maint. Plan, Inc., 582 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990). 
 423. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today, supra note 373, at 230-31. 
 424. See id. at 230 (citing Drolet v. Healthsource, 968 F. Supp. 757, 757-58 (D. N.H. 1997) 
(tortious interference class action suit based upon materially false and misleading statements of 
the MCO which compromised the physician-patient relationship); Maltz v. Aetna Health Plans, 
114 F.3d 9, 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1997) (ERISA based action claiming the MCO jeopardized the 
physician-patient relationship by forcing physician to either accept capitation or be dropped from 
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could assert such a claim if the patient is harmed because the medical treatment 
the patient actually received was inferior to the treatment he or she would have 
otherwise received had the utilization review process not interfered with the 
physician-patient relationship. 
As noted above, litigation based upon utilization review is an emerging 
and highly unsettled area of the law.  Division among the states with regard to 
whether utilization review is the practice of medicine creates much of this 
uncertainty, although the trend appears to be moving toward treating utilization 
review as the practice of medicine.425  If this trend continues, additional claims 
under many of the legal theories discussed above are likely to result.  
Moreover, the Third Circuit’s decision in In re U.S. Healthcare to allow direct 
negligence claims against MCOs for utilization review remains the minority 
view and its effect is still uncertain.  However, if In re U.S. Healthcare 
represents the beginning of a shift in the law, MCO liability pursuant to 
utilization review is likely to increase in the upcoming years. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the proliferation of managed care and the changing roles of health 
care providers and payors, courts struggle to balance common law theories of 
liability with ERISA’s stated goal of uniformity in benefit plan administration.  
MCOs play an extremely important role in health care cost containment, and it 
appears that the haphazard manner in which courts approach managed care 
liability has only led to increases in health care costs. 
Just over ten years ago, MCOs could take comfort in the knowledge that 
ERISA’s preemption provisions stood as a significant bar to plaintiff recovery 
under state law for anything other than enforcement of rights guaranteed under 
contracts between the MCO and its subscribers.  Now, with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rush, MCOs are faced with the prospect of having to tailor 
their system-wide medical review policies and procedures to the requirements 
of individual states.  Of course, the Rush decision is only the most recent 
advance in the continuing erosion of ERISA preemption.  As noted throughout 
this Article, courts generally appear more willing to hold MCOs liable as 
providers of care, and have extended to MCOs theories of liability once 
reserved for hospitals. 
MCOs and their legal counsel would be well advised to stay abreast of 
changes in managed care liability laws.  It may be quite some time before the 
federal and state legislatures are able to coordinate appropriate measures to 
allow MCOs the latitude needed to control medical costs, while at the same 
time providing the appropriate degree of protection to MCO subscribers.  That 
 
the plan; Dr. Trueman analogizes arguments made in the case to those which would have to be 
made under a tortious interference cause of action)). 
 425. Trueman, Liability of Directors, supra note 373, at 105. 
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being the case, it seems likely that courts will continue to approach managed 
care liability issues in an inconsistent, piecemeal fashion. 
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